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Article 
The Luxembourg Effect: Patent Boxes and 
the Limits of International Cooperation 
Lilian V. Faulhaber† 
  INTRODUCTION   
For decades, countries have turned to their tax systems to 
encourage innovation and entrepreneurship.1 They have pro-
vided tax credits and tax deductions for research and develop-
ment (R&D) expenses, accelerated depreciation for assets used 
in the R&D process, and reduced wage taxes for the employees 
engaged in this process.2 The goal of these tax incentives is to 
create an incentive for R&D that will eventually create valua-
ble intellectual property (IP) in the form of patents, copyrights, 
and other assets that will ultimately produce income.3 In the 
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Gamage, Itai Grinberg, Charles Gustafson, Omri Marian, Ruth Mason, Eloise 
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 1. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, Interna-
tional Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 347, 352 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 351–52. 
 3. Different countries define IP differently, and different tax incentives 
apply to different categories of IP. When referring to IP generally, this Article 
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last several years, more and more countries have also started to 
provide reduced tax rates on the income arising from IP assets 
as another way to create incentives for R&D.4 These reduced 
rates on IP income take the form of tax incentives referred to as 
“patent boxes,” where income from patents and other IP assets 
is separated from a taxpayer’s overall income and subjected to 
lower rates.5 
In the last decade, well over a dozen countries have imple-
mented patent boxes and similar tax incentives.6 Countries 
that do not have patent boxes, however, see them as examples 
of harmful tax competition since at least some patent boxes can 
be used to encourage income shifting by attracting income 
away from the country where the underlying R&D took place.7 
Countries without patent boxes thus fear that taxpayers who 
engaged in R&D in their countries (and benefited from their 
R&D incentives) could move the income from that R&D to an-
other country, where it would be taxed at a lower rate.8 
In 2013, this criticism of patent boxes overlapped with in-
ternational criticism of tax avoidance more generally. As news-
papers printed stories about large multinationals avoiding tax-
ation,9 and domestic legislatures hosted hearings about the 
 
uses a broad definition that can encompass the assets protected by any coun-
try’s tax incentives for IP. See, e.g., TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1, para. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 (“For the purposes of this Agreement, the term ‘intellectual 
property’ refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of 
Sections 1 through 7 of Part II [i.e., copyright and related rights, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of inte-
grated circuits, and protection of undisclosed information].”). When referring 
to IP in the context of the nexus approach, this Article uses the narrower defi-
nition to which the OECD and G-20 countries agreed. See infra notes 138–40 
and accompanying text. 
 4. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 1, at 362–63. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COUNTERING HARMFUL 
TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY 
AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT 63 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 
5: 2015 FINAL REPORT]. 
 7. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 1, at 372–75. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Vanessa Barford & Gerry Holt, Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The 
Rise of “Tax Shaming,” BBC NEWS MAG. (May 21, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/magazine-20560359; Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple 
Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and 
-nations.html. 
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same topic,10 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the G-20 initiated the Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project, which was a two-year pro-
ject to produce a range of required minimum standards and 
recommended best practices designed to target international 
tax avoidance.11 As part of this project, the OECD was charged 
with developing an approach to limit the elements of patent 
boxes that encouraged and allowed income shifting between ju-
risdictions.12 The OECD’s mandate was to develop an approach 
that would only permit countries to provide benefits to income 
that was linked to “substantial activities” that took place in the 
country providing benefits.13 The approach that the OECD de-
veloped came to be known as the “nexus approach.”14 Under the 
nexus approach, countries are only permitted to provide bene-
fits under patent boxes to the extent that there is a nexus be-
tween the income receiving benefits and certain qualifying 
R&D expenditures.15 Under this approach, benefits must be 
proportionate to the amount of R&D undertaken by the taxpay-
er receiving benefits or in the country providing benefits.16 
The nexus approach limits revenue loss from patent boxes 
by establishing a link between R&D and the income that may 
benefit, thereby constraining the ability of taxpayers to shift 
income between countries.17 It does not, however, eliminate all 
opportunities for income shifting, and it achieves its goal by 
creating pressures in favor of restructuring and against out-
sourcing and acquisitions, even when outsourcing and acquisi-
tions would not create any income shifting opportunities.18 The-
se weaknesses can be explained with reference to one 
phenomenon: European Union law. 
 
 10. See Offshore Profit-Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code Part 2 (Apple Inc.): 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 38 (2013) (testimony of 
Peter Oppenheimer, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Apple, 
Inc., accompanied by Phillip A. Bullock, Head of Tax Operations, Apple Inc.); 
see also Starbucks, Google, and Amazon Grilled over Tax Avoidance, BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20288077. 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. See infra Part I.B. 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
 16. See infra Part I.C. 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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Of the countries that took part in the BEPS Project, half 
were Member States of the European Union.19 The EU Member 
States that took part in the BEPS Project were unwilling to 
permit the OECD to issue any requirements or recommenda-
tions that would be inconsistent with European Union law.20 
Since the European Court of Justice21 has previously held that 
domestic R&D credits cannot discriminate based on the loca-
tion of the R&D,22 the nexus approach could not take the most 
logical approach, which would have been to establish a nexus 
between the location of the R&D and the country providing tax 
benefits to the income.23 Instead, it had to create a less intuitive 
nexus, between the entity incurring R&D expenditures and the 
entity receiving benefits.24 This version of the nexus approach 
will still reduce income shifting, but, because of the constraints 
imposed by European Union law, it will create more distortions 
and more possibilities for income shifting than a version that 
focused directly on the location of the income. 
These distortions and income shifting opportunities matter 
for the effectiveness of patent boxes and for international tax 
competition more generally. But they also illustrate an im-
portant phenomenon. Previously, discussions of EU law and the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence have focused primarily on the internal in-
consistency of the cases or the impact of these cases on Member 
 
 19. Note that, at the time of the BEPS Project, Latvia, a Member State of 
the European Union, was not yet a member of the OECD. It was, however, one 
of the forty-four countries participating in the BEPS Project as an OECD ac-
cession country, and it became a member of the OECD on July 1, 2016. See 
List of OECD Member Countries – Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member 
-countries.htm (last visited Mar 20, 2017). 
 20. In this Article, the terms “European Union law” and “EU law” are 
shorthand for the acquis of the European Union institutions, as well as the 
Treaty freedoms, cases by the ECJ and the other courts of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union interpreting and applying these freedoms, and relevant 
directives and regulations. 
 21. This Article refers to the Court of Justice as the European Court of 
Justice, or ECJ. The name of the court system of the European Union has been 
changed to the Court of Justice of the European Union, or CJEU, but many of 
the decisions mentioned in this Article were decided before this name change. 
Furthermore, the highest court is still referred to as the Court of Justice. 
Therefore, using one name for the same court is intended to provide consisten-
cy throughout the Article. 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
  
2017] THE LUXEMBOURG EFFECT 1645 
 
States.25 This Article argues that these discussions need to fo-
cus on the impact of EU law on countries outside the European 
Union as well. Although some academics have acknowledged 
that EU law can have implications for treaties or relations with 
countries outside the European Union (known as “third coun-
tries” in the context of EU law),26 this Article uses the nexus 
approach and other recommendations issued as part of the 
BEPS Project to illustrate that EU law has an even larger ef-
fect on third countries than previously acknowledged. It is no 
longer just a constraint on Member States.27 It is now a con-
straint on other countries as well, since non-EU countries are 
now competing in an international tax environment where the 
Member States cannot police tax avoidance in the most effec-
tive manner.28 Instead, the ECJ’s jurisprudence, which has lim-
ited the ability of Member States to police tax avoidance, has 
also put downward pressure on international anti-avoidance 
standards, thereby making it harder for non-EU countries to 
have robust anti-avoidance rules.29  
In a nod to Anu Bradford’s “Brussels Effect,” which de-
scribes how the EU has heightened regulatory standards in 
certain areas due to the combination of EU regulatory authori-
ty and market competition,30 I refer to this downward pressure 
on worldwide anti-avoidance standards as the Luxembourg Ef-
fect (because the primary seat of the European Court of Justice 
is in Luxembourg). In areas such as direct taxation, where the 
EU has no independent regulatory authority but the ECJ can 
strike down Member State provisions for violating the freedoms 
enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), the ECJ’s jurisprudence has created a vacu-
um.31 Member States cannot pass laws or regulations that vio-
late the Treaty freedoms, but EU institutions also cannot fill 
 
 25. See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimina-
tion and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186 
(2006); Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What Is Tax Discrimination?, 121 
YALE L.J. 1014 (2012). 
 26. See, e.g., Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court 
of Justice, 59 TAX L. REV. 65 (2005); Pasquale Pistone, The Impact of European 
Union Law on the Relations with Third Countries in the Field of Direct Taxa-
tion, 34 INTERTAX 234 (2006). 
 27. Graetz & Warren, supra note 25, at 1186–94. 
 28. Pistone, supra note 26, at 239–43. 
 29. Id. at 235–39. 
 30. See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 31. See infra Part II.A. 
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this void by passing EU-wide laws or regulations.32 What the 
BEPS Project and its outputs reveal is that this vacuum has ef-
fects outside of the European Union.33 Even though half of the 
countries involved in the BEPS Project (including the United 
States) were not Member States of the EU, their efforts to com-
bat tax avoidance through the BEPS Project were constrained 
by EU law, and they now face an international tax environment 
where it will be difficult to pass anti-avoidance legislation that 
is more robust than the low standard permitted by the ECJ.34 
This in turn raises significant concerns about the future of in-
ternational cooperation. If EU law places limits on what non-
EU countries can agree to in international negotiations, that is 
important for those countries to know as they enter into future 
negotiations or large-scale projects such as the BEPS Project. 
In order to illustrate the Luxembourg Effect, this Article 
proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces patent boxes and the 
nexus approach. This is the first in-depth description of the 
nexus approach in the literature, and it highlights the fact that 
the nexus approach in fact has two versions: the main “entity 
version,” which is subject to the constraints imposed by EU 
law, and the “location version,” which is hidden in the footnotes 
of the report describing the approach and which is not subject 
to those same constraints. Part II introduces the Luxembourg 
Effect and argues that EU law explains why the entity version 
of the nexus approach was adopted, even though it creates dis-
tortions and income shifting opportunities relative to the loca-
tion version. This Part sets out the three requirements for the 
Luxembourg Effect and explains why the Luxembourg Effect 
illustrates a significant cost of the recent “Brexit” vote for the 
United Kingdom that has not previously been acknowledged.35 
This Part also argues that EU law imposed limits on some of 
the other outputs of the BEPS Project, as well as other areas of 
direct tax law. Part III considers several possible responses to 
the Luxembourg Effect. Since none of these responses appears 
likely in the short term, Part III concludes that the first step 
 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.A. 
 35. “Brexit” is the term for the outcome of the UK referendum on June 23, 
2016, where the majority of voters elected to leave the European Union. See 
generally Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need To Know About the 
UK Leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk 
-politics-32810887 (discussing the circumstances and consequences of Brexit). 
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toward addressing the Luxembourg Effect is to acknowledge it. 
Discussions of EU law must focus on its effect outside the EU 
as well as inside the EU, and negotiators, lawyers, and academ-
ics outside the EU must realize that the ECJ is changing the 
legal environment for everyone, not just the Member States of 
the European Union. 
I.  PATENT BOXES AND THE NEXUS APPROACH   
In order to illustrate the long reach of EU law, Part I first 
introduces readers to patent boxes and the OECD/G-20 BEPS 
Project, and then outlines the two versions of the nexus ap-
proach. 
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT BOXES 
Studies have shown that R&D leads to greater economic 
growth,36 but private parties underfund R&D because they do 
not necessarily benefit from all the positive spillovers associat-
ed with innovation.37 In response to this market failure, coun-
tries have stepped in to use their tax systems to create incen-
tives for R&D.38 Countries and states have encouraged R&D by 
granting credits, deductions, and super-deductions for R&D ex-
penditures, accelerated depreciation for machinery and other 
assets used as part of R&D projects, and reduced wage taxes 
for employees engaged in R&D, among other incentives.39 These 
tax incentives all apply to the inputs to innovation, since they 
provide benefits at the time R&D is undertaken by providing 
credits or deductions based on the amount of R&D expendi-
tures.40 In recent years, over a dozen jurisdictions have also im-
 
 36. See, e.g., Graetz & Doud, supra note 1, at 348 (“[T]he importance of 
technological development to economic growth has been accepted ever since 
[Robert Solow’s 1957 paper].”). 
 37. Id. at 349–50; see also Bas Straathof et al., A Study on R&D Tax In-
centives 18 (CPB Neth. Bureau for Econ. Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 
52-2014, 2014) (“[M]arkets left on their own will probably generate less inno-
vation than would be desirable from society’s point of view. The reason is that 
knowledge is not completely excludable . . . [and] investments in research are 
more risky.”). 
 38. Graetz & Doud, supra note 1, at 349–52. 
 39. For a sense of the scale of tax incentives for R&D, see Straathof et al., 
supra note 37, at 6 (finding that the thirty-three countries studied in that arti-
cle had a total of over eighty R&D incentives). For an analysis of many such 
incentives, see Stephen E. Shay et al., R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea 
or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX L. REV. 419 (2016). 
 40. For a more detailed description of the variety of R&D incentives that 
are available, see Straathof et al., supra note 37. 
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plemented tax incentives that provide benefits to the outputs 
from innovation.41 In other words, rather than providing bene-
fits at the time that a taxpayer engages in R&D, these tax in-
centives provide reduced rates to income arising from the IP 
assets that resulted from that R&D.42  
The primary example of an output-based incentive is a pa-
tent box, which taxes income from patents (and sometimes oth-
er IP assets) at a reduced rate.43 These tax incentives are some-
times also called innovation boxes, knowledge development 
boxes, IP regimes, or the like,44 but this Article uses the term 
“patent box” to refer to all regimes that provide a reduced rate 
to income from IP assets. Patent boxes first originated in Eu-
rope,45 and their name is generally thought to refer to the box 
that taxpayers need to check off on a tax return in order to 
benefit from the reduced rate. Variations of these tax incentives 
are now in many non-European countries, including Colom-
bia,46 China,47 Israel,48 and Turkey.49 The design of these incen-
tives varies, with some only applying to income from patents50 
 
 41. See ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6. 
 42. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 1, at 363. 
 43. Id. at 362–63. 
 44. Id. 
 45. France and Ireland first introduced incentives for patent income in 
the 1970s and 1980s, but the trend of providing benefits for patent income did 
not take off for several more decades. In the interim, Ireland eliminated this 
incentive. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 1. 
 46. See Andrea Prieto, Colombia Decree 121/2014: National Council of 
Tax Benefits in Science, Technology and Innovation – Regulations Issued, 
IBFD TAX NEWS SERV. (IBFD Tax News Serv., Amsterdam, Neth.), Sept. 11, 
2014, at 1 (describing benefits provided to “new medical products and the 
software made in Colombia”). The Colombian regime described by Prieto is no-
ticeably different from most other patent boxes in that it focuses entirely on 
income from software, but it is an output incentive that applies to income from 
IP assets (i.e., software), and the OECD listed it in its lists of potentially 
harmful IP regimes subject to the nexus approach. See ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 6. 
 47. See SHI QI MA, CHINA (PEOPLE’S REP.) – CORPORATE TAXATION 31 
(2015) (describing the benefits provided for “high-new technology enter-
prise[s]”). 
 48. See INT’L AFFAIRS DEPT., STATE OF ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FIN., OPPOR-
TUNITY ISRAEL: ENHANCED LEGISLATION, R&D INCENTIVES, GRANTS AND SUP-
PORT PROGRAMS 27–28 (2012) (describing the regime provided to “preferred 
enterprises”). 
 49. See Investment Zones, INVS. SUPPORT & PROMOTION AGENCY TURK., 
http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/ 
SpecialInvestmentZones.aspx (describing the advantages provided to Technol-
ogy Development Zones) (last visited Mar. 9, 2017). 
 50. The United Kingdom and Belgium are countries that have limited 
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and others extending benefits to income from copyrights, 
trademarks, brands, know-how, and other forms of intellectual 
property.51 They also vary in terms of what type of income can 
qualify. Some only permit royalties from the sale or licensing of 
IP assets to qualify,52 while others allow so-called “embedded 
royalties” to qualify for benefits, which means that the reduced 
rate will apply to a portion of all the sales income from a good 
or service that was developed using the IP asset.53 Depending 
on the scope of the IP assets and the income that can qualify, 
therefore, patent boxes can provide benefits to taxpayers in a 
wide variety of industries ranging from pharmaceuticals and 
software to fashion design and car manufacturing. 
By 2013, patent boxes were in the news as more and more 
countries adopted them.54 Although these regimes had briefly 
 
their benefits to income from patents and extensions of patents. See Corpora-
tion Tax Act 2010, pt. 8A, c. 1, § 357A (U.K.); Marc De Mil & Tom Wallyn, In-
ternational Fiscal Association Branch Report: Belgium, in 100A CAHIERS DE 
DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL: STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW 145, 
158–59 (2015) [hereinafter STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW].  
 51. See, e.g., Netherlands Corporation Tax Act 2015, c. 2, pt. 2.3, § 12b 
(providing benefits to patented assets as well as intangible assets arising from 
R&D that received an R&D certificate under the Dutch Income Tax and Social 
Insurance Premium Relief Act); Spain Corporate Income Tax Act 2014, c. 4, 
§ 35 (providing benefits to patents, designs or models, plans, formulas or se-
cret procedures, and rights on information concerning industrial, commercial, 
or scientific know-how). Only a few, however, go so far as to extend to trade-
marks and marketing-related IP assets. Jurisdictions with innovation boxes 
that have extended to marketing-related intangibles include Hungary and 
Luxembourg. Borbála Kolozs & Annamária Koszegi, International Fiscal Asso-
ciation Branch Report: Hungary, in STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW, 
supra note 50, at 375; Frank van Kuijk, The Luxembourg IP Tax Regime, 39 
INTERTAX 140, 141 (2011). 
 52. Countries that have applied this limit include Hungary. See Kolozs & 
Koszegi, supra note 51, at 376. Likewise, France has not permitted certain 
types of embedded IP income to qualify for benefits. Georges Cavalier & Jean-
Luc Pierre, International Fiscal Association Branch Report: France, in STUD-
IES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW, supra note 50, at 312 (noting that embed-
ded royalties earned by companies that exploit their own IP may not qualify 
for benefits). 
 53. Countries that have provided benefits for embedded IP income include 
Belgium, Israel, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. See Cor-
poration Tax Act 2010, pt. 8A, c. 1, § 357A (U.K.); BILLUR YALTI, TURKEY – 
CORPORATE TAXATION 16 (2015); Leon Harris, Israel: Government Upgrades 
Company Tax Breaks, 61 TAX NOTES INT’L 564, 565 (2011); Margreet Nijhof & 
Michiel Kloes, An Improved Tax Regime for Intangibles in the Netherlands, 58 
TAX NOTES INT’L 69, 69 (2010); Eric Warson & Ruth Claes, The Belgian Patent 
Income Deduction, 50 EUR. TAX’N 319, 322–23 (2010). 
 54. See Annika Breidthardt, Germany Calls on EU To Ban “Patent Box” 
Tax Breaks, REUTERS UK (July 9, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk 
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been introduced in the 1970s,55 it was not until the Netherlands 
adopted its innovation box in 2007 and the United Kingdom 
implemented its patent box in 2013 that commentators focused 
in on the costs and benefits of these tax regimes. Critics of the-
se tax incentives argued that they were poorly targeted,56 that 
they did not increase R&D sufficiently to offset their significant 
cost,57 and that they encouraged income shifting and base 
stripping.58 Advocates argued that they were necessary to 
maintain a jurisdiction’s competitiveness and keep R&D in the 
 
-europe-taxes-idUKBRE9680KY20130709; Vanessa Houlder & Quentin Peel, 
UK Under Pressure from Berlin over Tax Competition, FIN. TIMES (June 13, 
2013), https://www.ft.com/content/fcf85732-d445-11e2-a464-00144feab7de. 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 56. This argument focuses on the fact that the benefits of patent boxes 
apply to income from patents, which in turn means that the benefits are only 
granted to taxpayers that already have income-generating patents. They 
therefore apply after the decision to research was made, and their application 
only to successful innovation means that they likely do not provide benefits to 
many of the innovators producing positive societal spillovers, particularly 
since the type of R&D that is most likely to be underfunded and that is also 
most likely to create positive spillovers appears to be basic R&D, much of 
which may not lead directly to income production. See, e.g., Martin A. Sulli-
van, A History Lesson for a Future Patent Box, 147 TAX NOTES 1036, 1038 
(2015) (“There is no readily apparent economic justification for granting pa-
tented technologies more favorable tax treatment than other IP (and in fact, 
some would argue that there is less of a reason since this property already en-
joys government-favored status).”); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: 
Patent Boxes, Research Credits, or Lower Rates?, 147 TAX NOTES 975, 975 
(2015) (stating that a patent box “wastes tax benefits on income from prior re-
search that is now manifesting itself in current income—a windfall for prior 
work that provides no incentive for new effort”); Straathof et al., supra note 
37, at 6 (stating that IP rights “enable firms to capture a large part of the soci-
etal benefits, such that the need for a tax incentive for protected innovations 
becomes unclear”); id. at 45 (“By subsidizing inventions that do not need a 
subsidy, patent boxes would induce inventions that are difficult to patent (and 
therefore might have high spillovers) relatively less attractive.”). 
 57. The empirical literature on patent boxes does not conclusively show 
whether patent boxes increase R&D. Although one 2015 paper found that, “for 
each percentage point reduction in the [corporate income tax] rate thanks to 
the patent box, the likelihood of registering a patent in the country concerned 
will rise” significantly across industries, a further finding of that same study 
was that, unless they require that development take place in the jurisdiction, 
patent boxes decrease the probability of inventors moving to the jurisdiction 
offering the patent box. Annette Alstadsæter et al., Patent Boxes Design, Pa-
tents Location and Local R&D 12 (European Comm. Joint Research Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 6/2015, 2015). Other studies, however, have suggested that 
patent boxes, even if they do not increase overall revenue, do attract IP income 
to the jurisdiction. Rachel Griffith et al., Ownership of Intellectual Property 
and Corporate Taxation, 112 J. PUB. ECON. 12, 22 (2014). 
 58. See Breidthardt, supra note 54; Houlder & Peel, supra note 54. 
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jurisdiction in the face of the growing number of patent boxes.59 
Despite these arguments, empirical literature on the effective-
ness and cost efficiency of patent boxes is quite limited.60 To the 
extent that there are empirical findings in this area, studies 
suggest that patent boxes that reduce the corporate income tax 
rate lead to an increased likelihood that patents (particularly 
high-quality patents)61 will be registered in the country provid-
ing the patent box,62 increase the amount of IP income in that 
jurisdiction,63 and correspond with a reduction in that jurisdic-
tion’s tax revenue.64 Studies have not yet been able to deter-
mine conclusively whether patent boxes lead to an increase in 
overall R&D, although at least one recent study suggests that 
in-country R&D increases if a patent box requires that R&D be 
undertaken in the jurisdiction.65 
 
 59. See, e.g., Charles Boustany, Jr., Boustany & Neal Release Patent Box 
Discussion Draft, ISPY (July 29, 2015), https://votesmart.org/public-statement/ 
1018460/boustany-neal-release-innovation-box-discussion 
-draft#WHxNXvkrLIU (quoting the legislators that proposed the U.S. patent 
box as wanting “to begin the conversation on how the United States can at-
tract and retain the brightest minds and best ideas on Earth” and “attract in-
novation and the high-paying, high-quality jobs that come with it”); HM 
TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: DELIVERING A MORE COMPETITIVE SYS-
TEM, 2010, at 51 (UK) (explaining the proposed patent box by stating that 
“[t]he Patent box will aim to reward successful technical innovation. The Gov-
ernment believes that it is right to introduce this reform now in order to pre-
vent movement of IP offshore and encourage the development of new patents 
by UK businesses, protecting and enhancing the status of the UK as a world 
leader in this field”). Another argument that was not made by patent box ad-
vocates but that could have supported their arguments is based on a 2001 pa-
per by Michael Keen, which suggested that preferential regimes could in fact 
reduce overall competition by focusing this competition on specific tax bases 
(i.e., geographically mobile income) rather than allowing jurisdictions to com-
pete across multiple tax bases. Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make 
Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 757 (2001). According to this 
view of preferential regimes, tax competition that focuses only on a specific tax 
base (say, IP income) will not reduce revenue as much as tax competition that 
cuts across all income sources. According to this argument, then, another rea-
son to support patent boxes is that they could theoretically be beneficial by fo-
cusing tax competition on income from IP assets, although Keen emphasized 
that his results were limited to the narrow two-country situation on which his 
model was based. 
 60. Graetz & Doud, supra note 1, at 375 (concluding in 2013 that “the ex-
tant data is too limited to adequately assess the effectiveness of patent box-
es”). 
 61. Alstadsæter et al., supra note 57, at 15. 
 62. Id. at 12. 
 63. Griffith et al., supra note 57, at 21–22. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Alstadsæter et al., supra note 57, at 19. 
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Even without empirical data showing the actual effect of 
patent boxes on the overall amount of R&D, countries continue 
to implement them, and taxpayers have increased their de-
mands for these regimes. By 2013, over a dozen patent boxes 
and similar tax incentives had been implemented in OECD and 
G-20 members.66 Several more existed in the European Union 
and European Economic Area, with Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and 
Malta all implementing patent boxes with tax rates ranging 
from 0% to 2.5%.67 Although the provisions that existed in 2013 
all provided reduced rates to income from IP, they varied signif-
icantly in the benefits that they provided.68 The tax rates ap-
plied to IP income by existing patent boxes ranged from zero 
percent to nineteen percent.69 As mentioned above, the IP as-
 
 66. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., COUNTERING HARMFUL 
TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY 
AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5: 2014 DELIVERABLE 58–59 (2014) [hereinafter AC-
TION 5: 2014 PROGRESS REPORT] (listing fifteen IP regimes that had been iden-
tified by 2014). 
 67. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL 
POLICIES OF THE UNION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BOX REGIMES: IN-DEPTH 
ANALYSIS FOR THE TAXE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, 2015, at 7 (UK). 
 68. See ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6. 
 69. See id. The rate that applied under the Belgian patent income deduc-
tion was 6.8%. Peter R. Merrill et al., Is It Time for the United States To Con-
sider the Patent Box?, 134 TAX NOTES 1665, 1666 (2012); Warson & Claes, su-
pra note 53, at 319. The rate under China’s reduced rate for new and high-tech 
enterprises ranged from 0% to 12.5%. Bernard Knight & Goud Maragani, It Is 
Time for the United States To Implement a Patent Box Tax Regime To Encour-
age Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 50 (2013). The rate 
under Colombia’s software regime was zero percent. CATALINA HOYOS 
JIMÉNEZ, COLOMBIA–CORPORATE TAXATION 19–20 (2015). The rate under 
France’s regime was fifteen percent. Cavalier & Pierre, supra note 52, at 313; 
Knight & Maragani, supra. The rate of the Hungarian regime was 9.5%. Ga-
bor Koka, Changes to Intellectual Property Box Regime Take Effect, 65 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 345, 345 (2012). The rate under Israel’s regime varied from nine 
percent to sixteen percent. HENRIETTE FUCHS, ISRAEL–CORPORATE TAXATION 
10 (2015). The rate under the Luxembourg regime was 5.76%. Van Kuijk, su-
pra note 51, at 140. The rate under the Dutch regime was five percent. Nijhof 
& Kloes, supra note 53. The rate under the Portuguese regime was scheduled 
to decrease from nineteen percent to seventeen percent by 2018. Tiago 
Cassiano Neves, Opening Pandora’s Box: 10 International Effects of Portugal’s 
Corporate Tax Reform, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 1223, 1224 (2013). The rate under 
the Spanish regime was fifteen percent. Jason M. Brown, Patent Box Taxation: 
A Comparison of Four Recent European Patent Box Tax Regimes and an Ana-
lytical Consideration of If and How the United States Should Implement Its 
Own Patent Box, 46 INT’L L. 913, 927 (2012). The rate under the Turkish re-
gime, which provides a fifty percent exemption, was ten percent. See YALTI, 
supra note 53, at 16–17 (stating that the Turkish corporate rate is twenty per-
cent). The effective rate under the United Kingdom regime was ten percent. 
  
2017] THE LUXEMBOURG EFFECT 1653 
 
sets that could benefit ranged from only patents and extensions 
of patents to everything from copyrighted software to know-
how and trademarks,70 and the income that could benefit also 
ranged from only royalties and licensing income to embedded 
royalties from the sale of goods and services.71 These regimes 
also varied in terms of whether they limited benefits based on 
who developed the IP or where the R&D took place.72 At least 
one country historically granted benefits only to income from IP 
that had been entirely developed by the taxpayer,73 but the ma-
jority of patent boxes that existed in 2013 also granted benefits 
to IP that was not self-developed but was instead acquired or 
developed through outsourcing.74 Some patent boxes outside the 
EU also imposed limitations based on jurisdiction, only provid-
ing benefits when the R&D that contributed to the income was 
done in the jurisdiction providing benefits.75 Patent boxes that 
had no limits on acquisition, outsourcing, or the location of the 
R&D provided the greatest benefit to taxpayers, while those 
that restricted benefits to self-developed IP or IP developed in 
the jurisdiction provided the least generous benefits.76 
 
Tom Scott & James Ross, The New Patent Box Regime and Corporate Tax Re-
form in the UK, 38 INT’L TAX J. 51, 51 (2012). 
 70. See supra notes 50–51. 
 71. See supra notes 52–53. 
 72. See Lisa Evers et al., Intellectual Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax 
Rates and Tax Policy Considerations 10 (Ctr. for European Econ. Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 13-070, 2013), ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13070 
.pdf. 
 73. See id. (describing the previous version of the Spanish innovation box). 
 74. Id. Many patent boxes did, however, place limits on either how much 
R&D can be outsourced or from whom IP can be acquired. Id. For example, 
both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom allowed outsourcing and acqui-
sition, but they required that the resident owner of the IP have taken on the 
risk associated with that IP. HM Revenue & Customs, Patent Box: Qualifying 
Companies: Groups: Active Ownership Condition, GOV.UK (Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/corporate-intangibles-research 
-and-development-manual/cird210210; Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 53, at 70. 
Belgium applied a similar requirement that the “overall responsibility and 
management of the R&D activities” must rest with the Belgian company. De 
Mil & Wallyn, supra note 50, at 160. Luxembourg limits acquisitions between 
related parties. Van Kuijk, supra note 51, at 143. 
 75. Regimes with jurisdictional limitations included those in China and 
Israel. Harris, supra note 53, at 565; W. Wesley Hill & J. Sims Rhyne, III, 
Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: Global Intellectual Property Tax Incentives and 
Their Implications for the United States, 53 IDEA—INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 371, 
385 (2013). 
 76. See Alstadsæter et al., supra note 57, at 3, 12 (finding that allowing 
acquired patents to benefit increases the tax advantage). This is because such 
restrictions by definition meant that such patent boxes did not allow as many 
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As more European countries adopted patent boxes that did 
not require that the R&D be done in the jurisdiction, countries 
that were known for having significant amounts of domestic 
R&D but that did not have patent boxes, such as Germany and 
the United States, feared that these tax incentives would lead 
to lower revenues as IP was shifted outside of their jurisdic-
tions and into jurisdictions with patent boxes.77 Several tax re-
form proposals, ranging from Chairman Camp’s “Option C” 
from 2011 to proposals from Senator Feinstein in 2012 and 
Representatives Boustany and Schwartz in 2013, included de-
signs for a U.S. patent box,78 and multiple commentators wrote 
advocacy pieces calling for such an incentive in the U.S.79 At the 
same time, the countries that did have patent boxes feared that 
they were losing the ability to tax IP income to other jurisdic-
tions with even more favorable patent boxes. For example, as 
countries such as Malta and Cyprus implemented patent boxes 
with rates that were well below ten percent and that did not 
require that the R&D take place in the jurisdiction, Spain mod-
ified its patent box to both reduce the rate that applied to IP in-
come and eliminate the requirement that qualifying IP be self-
developed, thereby making it easier for more taxpayers to bene-
fit from the lowered rate.80 
B. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BEPS PROJECT 
It was against the backdrop of these debates that the 
OECD started work on its two-year project to combat corporate 
tax avoidance. This project, which was known as the Base Ero-
sion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project, was a fifteen-point in-
ternational tax reform project supported and authorized by the 
G-20.81 The BEPS Project garnered significant political support 
and attention, partly because international tax avoidance itself 
 
IP assets to qualify, thereby limiting the amount of income that could benefit. 
 77. See Breidthardt, supra note 54 (highlighting Germany’s fear); Houlder 
& Peel, supra note 54 (same). 
 78. Jane Gravelle, A U.S. Patent Box: Issues, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS (Oct. 
15, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10289.pdf. 
 79. See, e.g., Merrill et al., supra note 69 (advocating for a U.S. patent 
box). 
 80. Compare Evers et al., supra note 72, at 10 (describing the 2008 ver-
sion of the Spanish IP box and stating that “only self-developed IP qualifies 
without exceptions”), with Corporate Income Tax Act art. 35 (B.O.E. 2014, 27) 
(Spain) (allowing for some IP that was not self-developed to qualify). 
 81. For a description of the top-down nature of the BEPS Project, see Itai 
Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016). 
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was receiving so much attention at the time the project was 
announced.82 The project was first proposed in the form of the 
BEPS Report, which laid out the general challenges facing the 
international tax system,83 and the fifteen specific Action Items 
were then set out in more detail in the BEPS Action Plan in Ju-
ly 2013.84 
Prior to this project, the OECD had already been active in 
international tax policy.85 The OECD has a Model Tax Conven-
tion, the changes to which are the subject of many OECD work-
ing party meetings, and the OECD encourages information 
sharing through the Global Forum on Transparency and Tax 
Administration.86 The OECD also sets out transfer pricing 
guidelines that are often discussed in working party meetings,87 
and it has published numerous reports on topics ranging from 
aggressive tax planning88 to bribery and corruption89 to the tax-
ation of high net worth individuals.90 Institutionally, the 
OECD’s work on international tax issues is carried out by the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which is made up of high-level tax 
officials in each member country; the Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration, which is made up of OECD staff; and a variety 
of working groups and expert groups that meet several times 
 
 82. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE 
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 13 (2013) [hereinafter BEPS ACTION PLAN] 
(acknowledging increased attention on international tax issues); Grinberg, su-
pra note 81, at 1 (providing examples of how international tax avoidance has 
become “front-page news”). 
 83. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING BASE ERO-
SION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013) [hereinafter BEPS REPORT] 
 84. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 14–24. 
 85. For further discussions of the role of the OECD in tax matters, see 
Hugh Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International 
Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 757 (2009); Allison Christians, Networks, 
Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2010); 
Grinberg, supra note 81. 
 86. See Grinberg, supra note 81, at 10 (discussing the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Tax Administration). 
 87. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD TRANSFER PRICING 
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 
(2010). 
 88. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CORPORATE LOSS UTILISA-
TION THROUGH AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING (2011); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., TACKLING AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING THROUGH IM-
PROVED TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE (2011). 
 89. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 
AWARENESS HANDBOOK FOR TAX EXAMINERS AND TAX AUDITORS (2013). 
 90. ORG. FOR ECOB. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ENGAGING WITH HIGH NET 
WORTH INDIVIDUALS ON TAX COMPLIANCE (2009). 
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per year to discuss various international tax topics.91 The BEPS 
Project fit into the existing international tax work that had 
previously been undertaken by the OECD, but it added all G-20 
countries that were not also OECD members to the discussions 
and it brought with it an accelerated time scale and significant-
ly more publicity and media attention than had attached to 
previous OECD tax projects. 
As part of this project, Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan 
required the OECD to “[r]evamp the work on harmful tax prac-
tices with a priority on . . . requiring substantial activity for 
any preferential regime.”92 Although this mandate did not men-
tion patent boxes, observers, delegates, and OECD staff read 
Action 5 to mean that the BEPS Project had to determine how 
to align the benefits granted by patent boxes with the substan-
tial activities that led to the income receiving benefits. This 
work was placed within the context of the OECD’s ongoing 
work on “harmful tax practices,” which had begun in 1998, 
when the OECD published Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue (known as “the 1998 Report”) and creat-
ed the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (the “FHTP”).93 The 
1998 Report marked a new phase in international tax coopera-
tion for several reasons. First, the 1998 Report did not just fo-
cus on general themes of cooperation and consensus. Instead, it 
focused on individual regimes implemented by individual coun-
tries, and its mere existence suggested that countries were 
complicit in the race to the bottom.94 Second, creating the FHTP 
at the same time as the 1998 Report was published ensured 
that this focus would continue for many years. Third, other por-
tions of the 1998 Report suggested that it was not merely indi-
vidual regimes that could be harmful but that entire countries 
could be named as tax havens.95 Although this part of the 
 
 91. See Ault, supra note 85, at 761–62 (discussing the makeup and func-
tion of the CFA). 
 92. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 18. 
 93. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: 
AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) [hereinafter 1998 REPORT]; see also Ault, 
supra note 85, at 767 (“The Report established a new subsidiary body within 
the OECD, the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which, since 1998, has ad-
ministered a set of guidelines on tax practices setting out certain obligations 
on countries that adopted the Report.”). 
 94. See 1998 REPORT, supra note 93, at 19–20 (describing the “race to the 
bottom”). 
 95. See id. at 21–25 (“Many fiscally sovereign territories and countries . . . 
offer the foreign investor an environment with a no or only nominal taxation 
which is usually coupled with a reduction in regulatory or administrative con-
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OECD’s work fell by the wayside over several years,96 it does 
highlight the country-specific focus of the FHTP’s continued 
work. Fourth, the framework that was established in the 1998 
Report still informs the work of the FHTP, and that framework 
has a very specific view of what it means for a regime to repre-
sent harmful tax competition. Under that framework, if a re-
gime applies a preferential low tax rate to geographically mo-
bile income and is ring-fenced (i.e., the low rate is not available 
to domestic taxpayers) or lacks transparency or effective infor-
mation sharing, then that regime will be listed in later reports 
by the FHTP as “potentially harmful.”97 Once a regime is found 
 
straints. . . . [T]hese jurisdictions are generally known as tax havens.”). 
 96. Compare id. at 21–22 (setting out the factors for identifying tax ha-
vens), with ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 15–16 (listing the 
work of the FHTP since the 1998 Report). 
 97. 1998 REPORT, supra note 93, at 25–26. The 1998 Report describes this 
requirement by setting out twelve factors for the FHTP to consider when de-
termining whether a jurisdiction has implemented a harmful regime. Id. at 
26–34. Four of these factors are labeled as “key factors,” which means that 
they are sufficient for a finding of harmfulness, while the other eight factors 
can indicate harmfulness. Id. The interpretation and interaction of these 
twelve factors was further elaborated on in several later OECD publications. 
See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CONSOLIDATED APPLICATION 
NOTE: GUIDANCE IN APPLYING THE 1998 REPORT TO PREFERENTIAL TAX RE-
GIMES 49 (2004); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX PRAC-
TICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT 7 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 PROGRESS RE-
PORT]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON 
HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT 4–5 (2002); ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRAC-
TICES: 2006 UPDATE ON PROGRESS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES 3 (2006); ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PRO-
GRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES (2001). 
The key factors from the 1998 Report are (i) that the regime applies no tax 
rate or a low effective tax rate; (ii) that the regime is ring-fenced (i.e., the ben-
efits are not fully available to domestic taxpayers); (iii) that the regime lacks 
transparency; and (iv) that the regime lacks effective exchange of information. 
1998 REPORT, supra note 93, at 26–30. In practice, the first factor is necessary 
but not sufficient for a finding of harmfulness, so one of the following three 
factors must also be evident for such a finding. See id. at 22–23 (“No or only 
nominal taxation is a necessary condition for the identification of a tax ha-
ven.”). Along with these four key factors, a regime must also be within the 
scope of the 1998 Report, which means that it must apply to geographically 
mobile income and be preferential (i.e., it must apply a more favorable rate 
than the general rate that would apply to corporate income). Id. at 25–26. 
Therefore, as envisioned in the 1998 Report, a harmful regime must apply a 
preferential low rate to geographically mobile income and either be ring-fenced 
or lack transparency or effective exchange of information. See id. The further 
eight factors were listed as possible further indicators of harmfulness that 
must be considered, but they were not necessary for any such finding. Id. at 
30–34. 
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to be potentially harmful, then it must go through an assess-
ment to determine if it is “actually harmful,” where the FHTP 
will consider economic data to determine whether the regime is 
in fact promoting harmful tax competition.98 If the regime is ac-
tually harmful, other jurisdictions may impose defensive 
measures.99 Since 1998, many jurisdictions have opted to 
amend or abolish their regimes rather than risk a label of ei-
ther potential harmfulness or actual harmfulness.100 
This earlier work on harmful tax practices provided the 
context for the OECD’s work on patent boxes. Despite the lack 
of any language in the BEPS Action Plan that focused on pa-
tent boxes, the OECD and G-20 member countries involved in 
this work interpreted the Action 5 mandate to mean that the 
FHTP should first focus on requiring substantial activities in 
what they referred to as “preferential IP regimes” (i.e., patent 
boxes), after which the work would then focus on other prefer-
ential regimes.101 In short, Action Item 5 provided an opportuni-
ty for the FHTP to focus on patent boxes, but it did so within 
the context of a broader project and with the involvement of 
 
 98. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 29 (“The process for determin-
ing whether a regime is harmful contains three broad stages: (i) consideration 
of whether a regime is preferential and of preliminary factors, to determine 
whether the regime needs to be assessed; (ii) consideration of key factors and 
other factors to determine whether a preferential regime is potentially harm-
ful; and (iii) consideration of the economic effects of a regime to determine 
whether a potentially harmful regime is actually harmful.”). 
 99. See Roman Grynberg & Bridget Chilala, WTO Compatibility of the 
OECD Defensive Measures Against Harmful Tax Competition, 2 J. WORLD IN-
VEST. 507, 507 (2001) (“Those jurisdictions that failed to sign memoranda by 
that date became subject to possible defensive measures which are, in effect, 
economic sanctions that can be instituted collectively or bilaterally by OECD 
Members.”). 
 100. See Ault, supra note 85, at 767–68 (stating that the 1998 Report and 
the subsequent FHTP process have “been extremely effective in bringing coun-
tries to eliminate regimes found to be harmful under the criteria of the Report. 
Of the forty-seven preferential tax regimes that had been identified as poten-
tially harmful in 2000, none of the regimes are deemed harmful at the present 
time. A number of regimes have been abolished, others have been amended to 
remove their potentially harmful features, and still others were found not to 
be harmful on further analysis of their actual impact”). 
 101. Cf. House of Commons, Written Statement made by the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. David Gauke), Dec. 2, 2014, HCWS55, (UK), 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/December%202014/ 
2%20December/3-Treasury-PatentBoxes.pdf (“Work by the OECD has focused 
on agreeing new rules on the level of substantial activities required for a pref-
erential regime to be considered a tax relief that supports real economic activi-
ty and not to be considered ‘harmful.’”). 
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non-OECD G-20 members that had not been involved in any of 
the FHTP’s previous work. 
As mentioned above, the literature on the effectiveness of 
patent boxes is still quite limited, and it was even more so at 
the time of the BEPS Project. The OECD therefore had to de-
cide how to address the challenges created by patent boxes, and 
it effectively split the difference between eliminating patent 
boxes entirely and allowing them to remain as they were in 
2013. Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan said nothing about 
eliminating patent boxes entirely, but it also did not permit the 
OECD and G-20 to leave existing patent boxes standing. In-
stead, it mandated that the FHTP require substantial activities 
in these regimes—without providing any clear guidance on 
what was meant by “substantial activities.”102 While countries 
with patent boxes might have preferred that patent boxes be 
left entirely unlimited and countries without patent boxes 
might have preferred that patent boxes be eliminated entirely, 
the OECD chose at the start of the BEPS Project to take nei-
ther of those routes and instead to require that patent boxes 
only provide tax benefits to income that arose from substantial 
R&D activities within the jurisdiction providing the patent 
box.103 The idea underlying this decision was that such a re-
quirement would prevent the income from IP from being shifted 
away from the jurisdiction where the underlying R&D had been 
performed and into a jurisdiction with a lower-rate patent 
box.104 
This decision was not without empirical support. As men-
tioned earlier, although the literature on the effectiveness of 
patent boxes remains fairly inconclusive, at least one empirical 
study does suggest that requiring that underlying R&D be done 
in the jurisdiction has the effect of increasing R&D, while pa-
tent boxes that do not have this jurisdictional requirement may 
 
 102. See BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 18. 
 103. See id. (“Requiring substantial activities for any preferential regime.”). 
 104. Note that this Article assesses the two versions of the nexus approach 
against the BEPS Project’s goal of preventing income from being shifted out-
side the jurisdiction. This Article does not consider whether or not the BEPS 
Project should have selected another goal (such as increasing global R&D or 
enhancing welfare), nor does it consider whether the two versions of the nexus 
approach would be consistent with different goals. Although such considera-
tions could be valuable in another Article, the purpose of this Article is to as-
sess what the OECD and G-20 countries produced against what they intended 
to achieve in order to determine both how the outcome differed from the intent 
and what observers can learn from any such differences. 
  
1660 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1641 
 
in fact decrease R&D in the jurisdiction.105 Furthermore, there 
were clear political reasons for making the decision not to elim-
inate patent boxes but also not to allow them to stand unchal-
lenged. Within the OECD, a significant minority of jurisdic-
tions had patent boxes. These included Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom.106 These coun-
tries were unwilling to eliminate their boxes entirely, particu-
larly since many, such as the United Kingdom, had staked sig-
nificant political capital on the creation of these regimes.107 
Jurisdictions without patent boxes, such as Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, however, were themselves unwilling to 
allow these regimes to exist without any restrictions, given that 
these regimes could lead to IP assets that had been created in a 
jurisdiction without a patent box to be acquired by a taxpayer 
in a jurisdiction with a patent box just as the IP assets began to 
produce income.108 One justification for front-end R&D incen-
tives is that the revenue foregone in subsidizing R&D will be 
recaptured in the form of tax revenue if and when that R&D is 
successful and produces income.109 If, however, other jurisdic-
tions have patent boxes that create incentives to shift that in-
come away from the jurisdiction that funded the underlying 
R&D, then jurisdictions without patent boxes feared that they 
would just be funding R&D without ever being able to tax the 
income that arose out of it.110 Jurisdictions without patent box-
 
 105. Alstadsæter et al., supra note 57, at 16–18 (suggesting that patent box 
regimes are found to deter local innovative activities, but local R&D develop-
ment conditions tend to ameliorate that effect). 
 106. See ACTION 5: 2014 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at 59. 
 107. See, e.g., Vanessa Houlder, Treasury Sets out Patent Incentive Expan-
sion, FIN. TIMES (June 10, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/2ba0d4b8-92d2 
-11e0-bd88-00144feab49a. 
 108. See, e.g., Alexandra Hudson, Germany May Close Foreign ‘Patent Box’ 
Tax Loophole – Report, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
uk-germany-taxavoidance-patentbox-idUKKCN0HM0BY20140927 (“With only 
a few countries offering such regimes currently, critics have called patent box-
es unfair, discriminatory and a form of tax avoidance.”). 
 109. See Cherie L. Jones et al., Should the United States Enact a Patent 
Box?, TAX ADVISOR (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/ 
nov/should-us-enact-patent-box.html (stating that countries do not want do-
mestic firms to be “holding IP and its resulting profits in foreign low-tax juris-
dictions to avoid taxation”). 
 110. See id. (“While there is evidence that patent boxes increase patents 
and investment in a country, concerns that they exert a significant effect on 
patent location without a change in real research activity nevertheless remain. 
Initial studies appear to confirm a disproportional bias. For example, one 
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es, particularly those with larger economies and more signifi-
cant R&D infrastructure, therefore had an interest in requiring 
that those regimes only be permitted to the extent that R&D 
was also undertaken in the jurisdiction providing the box. Alt-
hough this could be seen as encouraging jurisdictions with pa-
tent boxes to compete over not just the rate of the box but also 
the environment for R&D, it also suggests that the countries 
supporting a substance requirement were confident that they 
could prevail in the latter type of competition, while the same 
might not have been true in the context of a competition over 
rates. 
C. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXUS APPROACH 
The FHTP therefore had to create a new approach to defin-
ing substantial activities. This new approach, referred to as the 
“nexus approach,”111 was unveiled in the 2014 Progress Report, 
although not all jurisdictions had yet reached consensus on it.112 
On November 11, 2014, after the 2014 Progress Report was 
published, the United Kingdom and Germany announced that 
they had reached a compromise that would lead to acceptance 
of the nexus approach by all forty-four countries participating 
in the BEPS Project.113 The EU Code of Conduct Group then 
adopted the nexus approach that the FHTP had designed at the 
end of 2014.114 On February 6, 2015, the OECD itself issued a 
 
study found that the tax attractiveness of patent boxes is larger the broader 
their scope.”). 
 111. Note that some commentators have referred to this as the “modified 
nexus approach” due to its many iterations in 2014 and 2015. The nexus ap-
proach and the modified nexus approach are one and the same, and this Arti-
cle uses the former term to avoid confusion. 
 112. ACTION 5: 2014 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at 28–29 (discuss-
ing a focus on reaching a consensus on an approach to requiring substantial 
activities). 
 113. Press Release, Ger. Fed. Ministry of Fin., Germany and UK Agree 
Joint Proposal for Rules on Preferential IP Regimes (Nov. 11, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter German Press Release]; HM Treasury et al., Germany and UK Agree Joint 
Proposal for Rules on Preferential IP Regimes, GOV.UK (Nov. 11, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/germany-and-uk-agree-joint-proposal 
-for-rules-on-preferential-ip-regimes [hereinafter UK Press Release]. 
 114. See Bob van der Made, EU Update on Patent Boxes and the EU Code 
of Conduct Group, INT. TAX REV. (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.internationaltax 
review.com/Article/3430573/EU-Update-on-patent-boxes-and-the-EU-Code-of 
-Conduct-Group-Business-Taxation.html (“On patent boxes, following all dis-
cussions in the OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) around BEPS 
Action 5, a compromise regarding the modified nexus approach and how to as-
sess whether there is substantial activity in an IP regime, was endorsed by the 
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press release announcing that the nexus approach had been ac-
cepted and pledging to finish work on the approach by the end 
of June 2015.115 In October 2015, the OECD issued the final re-
port on Action 5, which was then accepted by the G-20,116 and 
this 2015 Report set out the final description of the nexus ap-
proach.117 The nexus approach is one of the four minimum 
standards produced as part of the BEPS Project, which means 
that it must be followed by any OECD or G-20 jurisdiction with 
a patent box or similar IP regime.118 
Under this approach, patent boxes and other IP regimes 
will not be found to be harmful if they require a nexus between 
the expenditures that contributed to the value of the IP income 
and the IP income that receives benefits. The amount of income 
that may benefit from a patent box under this approach is rep-
resented by the following equation:119 
Due to a political compromise between the UK and Germa-
ny, jurisdictions can permit taxpayers to increase the amount 
of qualifying expenditures by thirty percent so long as the re-
sulting ratio does not exceed one hundred percent.120 The nexus 
 
Code Group on November 20, 2014.”); see also Council of the European Union 
News Release 16603/14, Outcome of the Council Meeting (Dec. 9, 2014) (“[The 
Council] takes note of the agreement reached on the interpretation of the third 
criterion of the Code of Conduct with regard to patent boxes as contained in 
the existing mandate.”). 
 115. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION 5: AGREEMENT ON 
MODIFIED NEXUS APPROACH FOR IP REGIMES 5 (2015) [hereinafter FEB. 2015 
AGREEMENT] (stating that “further work [will] be concluded by June 2015”). 
 116. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 (“The BEPS package 
is designed to be implemented via changes in domestic law and practices, and 
via treaty provisions, with negotiations for a multilateral instrument under 
way and expected to be finalised in 2016. OECD and G20 countries have also 
agreed to continue to work together to ensure a consistent and co-ordinated 
implementation of the BEPS recommendations.”). 
 117. For the full description of the nexus approach, see id. at 24–36. 
 118. See BEPS – Frequently Asked Questions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ 
ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) (noting the 
adoption of the nexus approach). 
 119. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
 120. FEB. 2015 AGREEMENT, supra note 115, at 3–4; see also German Press 
Release, supra note 113; UK Press Release, supra note 113. 
Qualifying expenditures incurred 
to develop IP asset
x    Overall income =    Income receiving
Overall expenditures incurred from IP asset tax benefits
to develop IP asset
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approach sets the outer limits within which patent boxes will 
be found not to be harmful. The nexus approach does not re-
quire that countries implement patent boxes, nor does it re-
quire that countries implement patent boxes that apply the ex-
act equation above, but it does require that, in order to escape a 
finding of potential harmfulness, patent boxes cannot provide 
benefits to any income that would not qualify under the equa-
tion above.121 The OECD has thus described it as a “box around 
the box” because all patent boxes that jurisdictions choose to 
implement must fall within the confines of the nexus ap-
proach.122 
One key element of the nexus approach that is not made 
explicit in the 2015 Report is that there are essentially two ver-
sions of the nexus approach: the entity version, which must be 
implemented by any Member State of the European Union that 
has a patent box, and the location version, which could be im-
plemented by non-EU countries. The 2015 Report presents the 
entity version as the only version, since it can be adopted by all 
jurisdictions, but several footnotes of the 2015 Report highlight 
that jurisdictions outside the EU can choose to design their pa-
tent boxes quite differently. In the entity version, qualifying 
and overall expenditures are defined by focusing on which enti-
ty undertook them.123 Qualifying expenditures are those in-
curred by the individual entity benefiting from the patent box 
and any expenses for outsourcing to unrelated parties,124 while 
overall expenditures include these expenditures plus all acqui-
sition costs and any expenses for outsourcing to related par-
ties.125 In other words, the nexus ratio can be written as 
 
 121. Patent boxes may allow income that would not qualify under the nex-
us approach to qualify for benefits in limited circumstances if they treat the 
nexus ratio as a rebuttable presumption, but the presumption must be de-
signed such that it can only be rebutted in a narrow set of circumstances. See 
ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 35–36 (“Taxpayers would, 
however, have the ability to prove that more income should be permitted to 
benefit from the IP regime in exceptional circumstances where taxpayers that 
have undertaken substantial qualifying R&D activity in developing a qualify-
ing IP asset or product can establish that the application of the nexus fraction 
leads to an outcome where the level of income eligible for a preferential IP re-
gime is not commensurate with the level of their R&D activity.”). 
 122. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Live Webcast: The BEPS Package, 
LINKEDIN: SLIDESHARE (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.slideshare.net/OECDtax/ 
beps-webcast-8-launch-of-the-2015-final-reports [hereinafter BEPS Webcast]. 
 123. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 27–29. 
 124. Id. at 27–28. 
 125. Id. at 28–30. 
  
1664 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1641 
 
where OWN includes R&D expenditures incurred by the tax-
payer, UNRP includes expenditures for outsourcing R&D to 
unrelated parties, RP includes expenditures for outsourcing 
R&D to related parties, and ACQ includes expenditures for ac-
quiring IP from related or unrelated parties.126 Qualifying enti-
ties include resident taxpayers as well as both outbound and 
inbound PEs to the extent that those PEs are subject to taxa-
tion in the jurisdiction providing the patent box.127 
In the location version, qualifying and overall expenditures 
are instead defined by where the expenditures were incurred.128 
Qualifying expenditures are all R&D expenditures incurred in 
the jurisdiction providing benefits, while overall expenditures 
are all R&D expenditures incurred by the taxpayer, whether 
domestically or internationally.129 Therefore, in the location 
version, the nexus ratio can be written as 
where Domestic R&D includes all R&D expenditures incurred 
in the jurisdiction providing benefits (whether undertaken by 
the taxpayer itself or outsourced to or acquired from other par-
ties) and Foreign R&D includes all R&D expenditures incurred 
outside the jurisdiction (whether undertaken by the taxpayer 
itself or outsourced to or acquired from other parties). 
To illustrate the difference between the two versions of the 
nexus approach, take A Co., which is resident in Country A, a 
jurisdiction that has a patent box.130 A Co. has three subsidiar-
 
 126. Id. at 28. 
 127. This limitation appears to be based on the premise that it would not 
be beneficial for a taxpayer that was not otherwise subject to tax at the full 
corporate rate on its income in the jurisdiction to subject itself to taxation just 
for the sake of receiving a reduced rate. 
 128. Id. at 42 n.19 (“Jurisdictions that are not Member States of the EU 
could modify this limitation so that the acquisition of a taxpayer that incurred 
qualifying expenditures in the jurisdiction providing the IP regime allowed 
those expenditures to be included in the qualifying expenditures of the acquir-
er.”). 
 129. Id. at 42 nn.16, 19. 
 130. This example focuses entirely on A Co. in order to calculate what por-
tion of income allocated to A Co. according to transfer pricing principles would 
be permitted to benefit from Country A’s patent box. If Country B or Country 
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ies: Sub A, which is also resident in Country A; Sub B, which is 
resident in Country B; and Sub C, which is resident in Country 
C. This is shown below in Figure 1: 
Figure 1: 
A Co. earns royalty income from licensing out Patent A, 
which it owns. The initial R&D for Patent A was done by Sub 
C, which paid 500 to an unrelated company in Country A to 
undertake all its R&D. After the rights to the initial R&D were 
acquired by A Co. for 500, Patent A was further developed part-
ly by Sub A and partly by Sub B, each of which was paid 750 
for its R&D by A Co. and each of which undertook R&D in its 
country of residence. These expenditures are listed below in 
Table 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
C had their own patent boxes, a separate calculation would need to be under-
taken to determine if any income allocated to Sub B or Sub C would be able to 
qualify from those countries’ patent boxes. 
A Co.
Country A
Sub A
Country B Sub B
Country C
Sub C
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Table 1: 
A Co. Expenditures: 
Acquisition of Sub C R&D (undertaken in Country A) 500 
Outsourcing to Sub A (undertaken in Country A) 750 
Outsourcing to Sub B (undertaken in Country B) 750 
TOTAL 2000 
Under both versions, overall expenditures would equal 
2000.131 Under the entity version, there would be zero in quali-
fying expenditures because all expenditures for acquisition of 
the R&D rights from Sub C would be excluded from qualifying 
expenditures, as would all expenditures for outsourcing to both 
Sub A and Sub B because they are both separate entities from 
A Co. that are also related parties. Note that this creates an in-
centive to restructure Sub A so that it either earns the income 
of its own R&D or so that it merges with A Co. 
Under the location version, there would be 1250 in qualify-
ing expenditures, which would include both the 500 in Country 
A R&D expenditures incurred by Sub C and the 750 in Country 
A R&D expenditures incurred by Sub A.132 In both versions, the 
expenditures incurred for R&D undertaken by Sub B would be 
included in overall expenditures and excluded from qualifying 
expenditures. In the entity version, this is because Sub B is a 
related entity. In the location version, this is because Sub B’s 
R&D was undertaken outside of Country A.133 
 
 131. This is because 500 + 750 + 750 = 2000. Note that this example is 
simplified because A Co. paid the same amount to Company C that Company 
C paid for R&D expenditures. If Company C had paid 400 in R&D expendi-
tures, all of which were for R&D in Country A, then overall expenditures in 
the location version would be only 1900. Both examples assume that Company 
C was able to show that it had engaged in complete tracking and tracing to 
ensure that it did not incur any other expenditures. See ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 42 n.19 (discussing how complete tracking and trac-
ing ensure that all overall expenditures are include). If Company C was not 
able to show this, then overall expenditures would include A Co.’s acquisition 
costs rather than Company C’s R&D costs in the location version as well as 
the entity version. Id. 
 132. This is again only true if Company C engaged in tracking and tracing 
that could show that all of its R&D expenditures were for R&D in A Co. Id. 
 133. This is a further difference between the two versions, and it means 
that greater base erosion could be permitted under the entity approach. See id. 
at 34–35.  
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These two versions represent two very different visions of 
substantial activities. Under the entity version, substantial ac-
tivities do not include any R&D outsourced to a related party or 
any R&D done by another party that was then acquired. Under 
the location version, these activities may constitute substantial 
activities if they were undertaken within the jurisdiction 
providing benefits, regardless of which entity undertook them, 
while any outsourcing outside the jurisdiction (whether to a re-
lated or unrelated party) does not constitute substantial activi-
ties. In other words, substance as defined in the entity version 
depends on who engages in R&D, while substance as defined in 
the location version depends on where the R&D takes place. 
These two visions of substance may often overlap, but they dif-
fer in terms of fundamental principles. 
Although the two versions differ in terms of their overall 
focus, they do share the same general requirements. Both ver-
sions of the nexus approach share the same definition of IP as-
sets134 and overall income from IP,135 and they also share the 
same requirements for tracking and tracing of income,136 as well 
as grandfathering.137 In terms of IP assets, the 2015 Report ex-
plicitly states that only “patents and other IP assets that are 
functionally equivalent to patents” can qualify under a nexus-
compliant patent box, and any patent box that provides bene-
fits to other IP assets will therefore be considered potentially 
harmful.138 The 2015 Report defines functionally equivalent IP 
assets to include copyrighted software, and it also permits ju-
risdictions to extend benefits to a third category of IP assets 
that are “non-obvious, useful, and novel.”139 The taxpayers re-
ceiving benefits for this third category of assets fall into a nar-
rowly defined category of small enterprises.140 Both the 2014 
 
 134. Id. at 26 (“Under the nexus approach as contemplated, the only IP as-
sets that could qualify for tax benefits under an IP regime are patents and 
other IP assets that are functionally equivalent to patents if those IP assets 
are both legally protected and subject to similar approval and registration pro-
cesses, where such processes are relevant.”). 
 135. Id. at 29 (suggesting that “jurisdictions will define ‘overall income’ 
consistent with their domestic laws on income definition after the application 
of transfer pricing rules” but requiring the definition itself to uniformly comply 
with the principles that “[i]ncome benefiting from the regime should be pro-
portionate” and “[o]verall income should be limited to IP income”). 
 136. Id. at 30–34. 
 137. Id. at 34–35 (describing the grandfathering rules). 
 138. Id. at 41 n.9. 
 139. Id. at 26. 
 140. Such enterprises can have “no more than EUR 50 million (or a near 
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Progress Report and the 2015 Report make clear that trade-
marks and marketing-related IP assets do not fall within the 
definition of qualifying IP assets.141 Although this distinction is 
not explained in greater detail, this is likely due to the stated 
principle of the nexus approach, which is to grant benefits only 
to taxpayers that engaged in value-creating R&D activities.142 If 
patent boxes were permitted to grant benefits to all income 
arising from trademarks or other marketing related intangi-
bles, these could arguably grant benefits to all income earned 
by a company, given that the value of trademarks, brands, 
know-how, and other non-qualifying IP assets arises from all 
the activities of a company. This in turn would mean that a pa-
tent box was essentially just providing a lower rate for all the 
income earned by any company with a marketing intangible. 
In terms of overall income from IP, the 2015 Report leaves 
a significant amount of flexibility to jurisdictions as to how they 
can define and calculate qualifying income.143 Jurisdictions are 
not required to provide benefits to embedded IP income (i.e., 
the portion of sales income that represents an embedded royal-
ty),144 nor are they prohibited from doing so.145 The 2015 Report 
instead states that jurisdictions should ensure that they do not 
provide benefits to gross income, although it leaves flexibility to 
 
equivalent amount in domestic currency) in global group-wide turnover” and 
may not “themselves earn more than EUR 7.5 million per year (or a near 
equivalent amount in domestic currency) in gross revenues from all IP assets, 
using a five-year average for both calculations.” Id. 
 141. Id. at 27 (“[M]arketing-related IP assets such as trademarks can never 
qualify for tax benefits under an IP regime.”); ACTION 5: 2014 PROGRESS RE-
PORT, supra note 66, at 31. 
 142. See ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 24–25 (discussing 
how the nexus approach is focused on “real value added by the taxpayer” and 
“grant[ing] benefits only to income that arises from IP where the actual R&D 
activity was undertaken by the taxpayer itself ”). 
 143. See id. at 29 (describing how a jurisdictions is free define “overall in-
come” in any way as long as the definition is consistent with the two principles 
that follow). 
 144. An example of embedded income would be sales income from a com-
pany that owned an IP asset that contributed to the value of a product (Com-
pany A). If Company A had licensed or sold the IP asset to another company 
that then produced the product, Company A would have received royalties 
that would qualify as IP income. If Company A instead keeps the IP asset and 
produces the product itself, then a portion of the income from sales of the 
product essentially represent a royalty payment for Company A’s own use of 
the IP asset. This portion of the sales income is embedded IP income. 
 145. See id. (“[Overall income] may include royalties, capital gains and oth-
er income from the sale of an IP asset, and embedded IP income from the sale 
of products and the use of processes directly related to the IP asset.”). 
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them as to how they define net income, and that they should 
also ensure that, if they do provide benefits to embedded IP in-
come, they do so in a way that ensures that routine marketing 
and manufacturing returns do not receive benefits.146 
Because the nexus approach requires a link between ex-
penditures and income, both versions also require that taxpay-
ers that benefit from a patent box must engage in sufficient 
“tracking and tracing” to ensure that the income receiving ben-
efits did in fact arise from qualifying expenditures.147 In the 
2014 Progress Report, the general description of the nexus ap-
proach required that taxpayers track and trace expenditures 
and income either to individual IP assets or to individual prod-
ucts.148 The 2015 Report acknowledges that such narrow track-
ing and tracing may be impossible for large taxpayers with 
multiple R&D projects and streams of income, so it also permits 
tracking and tracing to product families if taxpayers can show 
that they could not feasibly track and trace to a narrower cate-
gory and they can show that each product family includes over-
lapping streams of expenditures and revenues.149 
Both versions of the nexus approach also permit the grand-
fathering of patent boxes that existed prior to a certain date.150 
This is consistent with previous work of the FHTP, which al-
lowed regimes that would otherwise be potentially harmful to 
be grandfathered if “(1) no new entrants are permitted into the 
regime, (2) a definite date for complete abolition of the regime 
has been announced, and (3) the regime is transparent and has 
effective exchange of information.”151 Patent boxes and other IP 
regimes may therefore continue to grant benefits to pre-
existing beneficiaries after June 30, 2016, as long as the juris-
diction with the patent box had begun a legislative process to 
 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. at 30–34. 
 148. ACTION 5: 2014 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at 34, 50 n.3. 
 149. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 31–32. Both versions 
of the nexus approach also permit jurisdictions to establish a transitional 
measure, although the outlines of such a transitional measure are again left to 
jurisdictions to decide. Id. at 33. The 2015 Report does provide an example of 
such a transitional measure, but it makes clear that this is only provided as an 
illustration of a possible transitional measure that a jurisdiction could adopt. 
Id. at 72 (“This Annex provides only one example of how a transitional meas-
ure could be designed to ensure that taxpayers had sufficient time to adapt to 
tracking and tracing requirements while still complying with the general prin-
ciples of the nexus approach.”). 
 150. Id. at 34–35. 
 151. 2004 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 97, at 9–10. 
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modify the box in 2015.152 Patent boxes may not, however, pro-
vide benefits to the extent that the IP assets benefiting from a 
grandfathered patent box were acquired from a related party 
after January 1, 2016, if they could not have qualified from a 
patent box at the time of acquisition.153 In other words, if a tax-
payer that benefited from an existing patent box on or before 
June 30, 2016, acquired an IP asset from an unrelated party in 
any jurisdiction or from a related party in a jurisdiction with a 
patent box (including in the same jurisdiction as the taxpayer), 
it can qualify for grandfathering, including on income from that 
IP asset. If not, it can qualify for grandfathering on income 
from IP assets not including the acquired IP asset. As stated in 
the February 6, 2015, press release, this grandfathering safe-
guard was designed to prevent taxpayers from circumventing 
grandfathering by transferring IP assets into a qualifying pa-
tent box at the last minute.154 
As of June 30, 2016, therefore, all new patent boxes must 
comply with the nexus approach, and no taxpayers can benefit 
from patent boxes that do not comply with this approach after 
June 30, 2021, at the very latest.155 Patent boxes that do not 
comply with the nexus approach by these dates will be found to 
be potentially harmful and will then be subject to the FHTP’s 
analysis of actual harmfulness.156 If a patent box is found to be 
actually harmful, other countries may implement defensive 
measures to offset the effects of the regime.157 
The overall effect of the nexus approach remains to be 
seen, but the fact that there are two different versions of the 
approach means that this approach may be less likely to 
achieve the OECD’s goal of only allowing reduced rates for in-
come arising from R&D undertaken in the country with the pa-
tent box.158 Instead, as will be outlined in the next Part, the en-
 
 152. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 34. 
 153. Id. at 35. 
 154. FEB. 2015 AGREEMENT, supra note 115, at 4 (stating that the agree-
ment is designed to resolve concerns about, inter alia, grandfathering). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 20 (setting out the 
criteria for a finding of potential harmfulness). 
 157. See id. at 21. 
 158. Note that this Article does not consider whether the OECD could or 
should have had a different goal in Action 5, such as reducing deadweight loss 
or maximizing welfare. It is instead intended to highlight that Action 5 was 
designed to require that any income that received benefits from a preferential 
regime also arose from substantial activities in the jurisdiction with the pref-
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tity version of the nexus approach may allow taxpayers and 
countries to continue to do at least some R&D in one country 
and still benefit from a low-rate patent box in another country. 
II.  THE LUXEMBOURG EFFECT AND THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION   
As suggested by its name, the entity version of the nexus 
approach that appears in the 2015 Report requires patent box-
es to divide expenditures by entity.159 If the expenditures were 
incurred by the entity or for outsourcing to an unrelated party, 
then they will be qualifying expenditures that increase the 
amount of income that qualifies for benefits.160 If they were ex-
penditures for acquiring IP from another entity or for outsourc-
ing to a related party, then they will reduce the amount of in-
come that qualifies for benefits.161 Taken together, these 
requirements mean that the entity version of the nexus ap-
proach is designed to discourage both the shifting of income 
from entity to entity and the shifting of innovation from entity 
to entity. Whereas existing patent boxes focused more on the 
shifting of income, the nexus approach now requires that they 
also focus on the shifting of innovation and only grant benefits 
to income when the innovation itself was undertaken by the en-
tity receiving benefits.162 
This in turn suggests one vision of substance that under-
lies the entity version of the nexus approach. Because this ver-
sion maintains a strict focus on entities rather than on jurisdic-
 
erential regime. See BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 18 (stating that ac-
tion 5 was designed to require “substantial activity for any preferential re-
gime”). 
 159. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 28 (“Overall expendi-
tures should be defined in such a way that, if the qualifying taxpayer incurred 
all relevant expenditures itself, the ratio would allow 100% of the income from 
the IP asset to benefit from the preferential regime.”). 
 160. Id. at 30 (“Allowing only expenditures incurred by unrelated parties to 
be treated as qualifying expenditures thus achieves the goal of the nexus ap-
proach to only grant tax benefits to income arising from the substantive R&D 
activities in which the taxpayer itself engaged that contributed to the in-
come.”). 
 161. Id. at 28 (“The nexus approach therefore does not include all expendi-
tures ever incurred in the development of an IP asset in overall expenditures. 
Instead, it only adds two things to qualifying expenditures: expenditures for 
related-party outsourcing and acquisition costs.”). 
 162. See id. at 37 (“When applied to IP regimes, the substantial activity 
requirement establishes a link between expenditures, IP assets, and IP in-
come.”). 
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tions, it suggests that the fundamental issue underlying patent 
boxes was not that income was being taxed in one jurisdiction 
while the activities were taking place in another jurisdiction. 
Instead, the concern about substantial activities was that they 
were taking place in one entity (regardless of its location) while 
the income was being allocated to another entity (regardless of 
its location). According to the logic of the entity version of the 
nexus approach, this means that a taxpayer that structures it-
self such that one domestic subsidiary engages in certain R&D 
activities while another domestic subsidiary earns the income 
from those activities is engaged in impermissible tax planning. 
The location version of the nexus approach, in contrast, fo-
cuses on jurisdictions rather than entities.163 This version 
grants benefits only to the extent that the R&D expenditures 
were incurred for R&D undertaken in the jurisdiction granting 
benefits.164 If a taxpayer pays for R&D undertaken in another 
jurisdiction, those expenditures will reduce the amount of in-
come that can benefit. This version again discourages both the 
shifting of income and the shifting of innovation, but the focus 
is not on shifting from entity to entity but rather from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. Under the vision of substance supported by 
this version, base erosion and profit shifting takes place not 
through shifting between entities but rather through shifting 
between jurisdictions. This version is not concerned with 
whether the R&D was undertaken by one entity or another, but 
it is instead concerned with where the R&D took place, and 
subjecting the income to tax in one jurisdiction when the R&D 
activities took place in another jurisdiction is seen as imper-
missible tax planning under this view of substance. 
Under the entity version of the nexus approach, the focus 
on shifting between entities means that domestic subsidiaries 
are treated as separate entities. Therefore, taxpayers with mul-
tiple subsidiaries within a jurisdiction that want to benefit fully 
from a patent box must restructure to ensure that the entity 
that earns income from an IP asset is the same entity that in-
curs the R&D expenditures for that IP asset, which may re-
quire a different corporate structure than would otherwise be 
selected for business reasons. Moreover, since the entity ver-
sion does not distinguish between outsourcing to domestic or 
 
 163. See id. at 42 nn.16, 19 (laying out the salient modifications that dis-
tinguish the location approach from the entity version). 
 164. See id. at 42 n.19. 
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foreign entities or between acquiring IP developed through do-
mestic or foreign R&D, this version of the nexus approach cre-
ates a disincentive against both outsourcing to all related par-
ties and all forms of acquisition. This could therefore lead 
companies to view outsourcing and acquisition as more costly 
than before, even if these would otherwise be the most efficient 
ways to develop an IP asset or increase the amount or quality 
of innovation. 
A second effect of the entity focus could be to allow some 
shifting of income across jurisdictions since branches are not 
separate taxable entities. Consider the earlier example illus-
trated in Figure 1,165 and imagine that Sub B is instead Branch 
B, a branch of A Co. The 750 paid to Branch B and then used 
for the R&D done in Country B could now be treated as 750 
paid by A Co. for R&D rather than for related-party outsourc-
ing. It would therefore become a qualifying expenditure, even 
though the R&D was undertaken in Country B, and the nexus 
ratio as calculated under the entity version of the approach 
would now be 37.5 percent—or 48.75 percent if Country A ap-
plied the thirty percent uplift. Therefore, in this example, no 
income would qualify for the box if Sub B remained a separate 
entity, but almost half of IP income could qualify if Sub B were 
instead treated as a branch. The entity focus could thus en-
courage companies to establish branches instead of subsidiar-
ies, and it could also permit income to qualify even when the 
underlying R&D took place elsewhere. 
It is unlikely that this would lead to significant income 
shifting because work in other areas of the BEPS Project 
should limit the ability of taxpayers to have such an arrange-
ment respected for tax purposes. Under the Action 7 output, if 
Branch B had the significant R&D facilities necessary to devel-
op Patent A, Branch B would likely be treated as a taxable PE 
in Country B.166 This would therefore mean that Country B 
would have taxing jurisdiction over the 750 paid to Sub B, 
whereas previously this payment from head office A Co. to 
Branch B would have been a wash for Country A tax purposes. 
This in turn means that it is unlikely that taxpayers will shift a 
 
 165. See supra Part I.C. 
 166. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PREVENTING THE ARTIFI-
CIAL AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT STATUS, ACTION 7: 2015 FI-
NAL REPORT 9 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 7 FINAL REPORT] (making it more 
difficult for the branch in the above example not to be treated as a permanent 
establishment). 
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significant amount of R&D to foreign branches, but the entity 
version of the nexus approach does allow for some slippage at 
the margins, since taxpayers now have an incentive to shift just 
enough R&D to a branch so that it will increase the nexus ratio 
while not shifting so much R&D that it will lead the branch to 
be treated as a taxable permanent establishment in the foreign 
jurisdiction. 
Even if neither of these effects ends up being very large, 
they reveal that the entity version of the nexus approach will 
allow some out-of-country R&D to qualify the resulting IP in-
come for reduced rates under a patent box. Even if only a small 
amount of foreign R&D is permitted under the entity version, 
this slippage is notable because the OECD’s stated goal under 
Action 5 was to prevent any income from qualifying for reduced 
rates, and yet the entity version undermines this goal and al-
lows the very jurisdictional income shifting that the BEPS Pro-
ject was designed to prevent. 
If the nexus approach had only included the location ver-
sion, several of the weaknesses identified above would not ex-
ist. First, there would be fewer opportunities for taxpayers to 
receive benefits for income even when R&D had not taken place 
in the jurisdiction providing benefits. Second, taxpayers would 
be free to outsource to any parties they saw fit or acquire IP as-
sets at any stage of their development with no effect on the 
amount of income that could benefit, so long as the underlying 
R&D had itself been undertaken in the jurisdiction. A third 
benefit of using only the location version is that, to the extent 
that existing research can provide guidance on the design of pa-
tent boxes, the literature suggests that having a jurisdictional 
requirement is necessary to increase R&D within the jurisdic-
tion, so the location version is more consistent with countries’ 
stated goal of increasing R&D.167 Finally, the location version is 
more consistent with the goals of the BEPS Project, given that 
the description of substantial activities in the BEPS Report fo-
cused on shifting income between jurisdictions, not entities.168 
The nexus approach, however, does not only include the lo-
cation version, and this version is in fact hidden away in the 
footnotes of the 2015 Report. Why, then, did the OECD agree 
 
 167. See, e.g., Boustany, supra note 59. 
 168. See BEPS REPORT, supra note 83, at 13 (“There is a growing percep-
tion that governments lose substantial corporate tax revenue because of plan-
ning aimed at shifting profits in ways that erode the taxable base to locations 
where they are subject to a more favourable tax treatment.”). 
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on a version of the nexus approach that discourages outsourc-
ing and acquisition, regardless of where the underlying R&D 
takes place? Instead of choosing a version that focuses on juris-
diction, why did the OECD settle on a more complicated and 
less intuitive version that focuses on the entity that undertook 
the R&D rather than the jurisdiction where the R&D took 
place? 
A. THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW ON PATENT BOXES 
AND THE NEXUS APPROACH 
The reason that the entity version of the nexus approach 
exists is EU law. Countries participating in the BEPS Project 
believed that the treaty freedoms of the European Union would 
not permit the Member States of the EU to adopt a patent box 
that focused on jurisdiction.169 Although direct taxation is one of 
the few remaining areas where EU institutions are not able to 
act without the unanimous consent of the twenty-eight Member 
States of the European Union, Member States are still limited 
in their ability to design direct tax provisions by the fundamen-
tal freedoms protected by the EU treaties.170 These freedoms 
are intended to prevent Member States from undermining the 
single market by establishing barriers to movement or invest-
ment, and EU law has evolved to consider many location-based 
restrictions on tax incentives to violate these freedoms. There-
fore, although the European Union institutions may not have 
the ability to pass direct tax legislation without the unanimous 
support of all of the EU Member States, the effect of the EU 
treaties and the ECJ’s interpretation of the freedoms protected 
by those treaties has been to limit the types of direct tax laws 
that Member States can themselves implement, and Member 
States participating in the BEPS Project understood this limi-
tation to extend to patent boxes.171 
Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) prohibits Member States from restricting the 
 
 169. Cf. id. at 9 (“The OECD is committed to delivering a global and com-
prehensive action plan based on in-depth analysis of the identified pressure 
areas with a view to provide concrete solutions to realign international stand-
ards with the current global business environment.” (emphasis added)). 
 170. See, e.g., Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Colmer, 1998 
E.C.R. I-4695, I-4721 (“Although direct taxation is a matter for the Member 
States, they must nevertheless exercise their direct taxation powers consist-
ently with Community law.”). 
 171. Cf. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 9 (indicating that the BEPS 
Project required international cooperation to deal with patent boxes). 
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freedom of establishment,172 while Article 56 of the TFEU pro-
hibits Member States from restricting the freedom to provide 
services.173 In other words, Articles 49 and 56 are anti-
discrimination provisions that prohibit Member States from 
discriminating in favor of residents in terms of who can, respec-
tively, establish a business in the Member State or provide ser-
vices in the Member State. After the ECJ determines in a case 
before it that a Member State provision such as an R&D incen-
tive violates the freedoms enshrined in the TFEU, the Court 
applies a proportionality analysis under which a provision that 
violates one of the fundamental freedoms could still be found to 
be consistent with the TFEU if it were both justified by one of 
the justifications that the ECJ has previously accepted and 
proportionate to that justification (i.e., tailored sufficiently nar-
rowly to restrict the freedom only to the extent necessary to 
achieve the justification).174 In direct tax cases, however, the 
ECJ has only accepted a few justifications for an otherwise re-
strictive direct tax provision. These permitted justifications in-
clude ensuring fiscal cohesion,175 ensuring the balanced alloca-
tion of taxing power,176 and the prevention of abuse.177 The ECJ 
has rejected both the prevention of revenue loss and the promo-
tion of research as justifications for a restriction on the funda-
mental freedoms.178 In previous cases, the ECJ has held that 
 
 172. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Europe-
an Union art. 49, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C202) 67 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 173. Id. at art. 56. Other articles of the TFEU protect the free movement of 
goods, workers, and capital, but the freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services are the two freedoms that have been implicated in cases con-
sidering R&D incentives. 
 174. See, e.g., Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. 
I-10837, I-10879 (“Such a restriction is permissible only if it pursues a legiti-
mate objective compatible with the Treaty and is justified by imperative rea-
sons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that its ap-
plication be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective thus 
pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.”). For a longer ex-
planation of the three-part analysis that the ECJ applies to cases considering 
the fundamental freedoms, see Lilian V. Faulhaber, Sovereignty, Integration 
and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the Proper Balance, 48 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, 190–93 (2010). 
 175. See Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belg. State, 1992 E.C.R. I-249, I-
283–84 (discussing justification by “the need to ensure the cohesion of the tax 
system”). 
 176. See Case C-379/05, Amurta SGPS v. Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst/Amsterdam, 2007 E.C.R. I-9569, ¶ 56. 
 177. See Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. PLC (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall 
Colmer (HM Inspector of Taxes), 1998 E.C.R. I-4695, ¶ 28. 
 178. See Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Finanzamt Aachen-
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R&D incentives that only apply to R&D undertaken in the 
Member State providing the incentive are unjustified violations 
of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide ser-
vices.179 The reason that such incentives have been found to vio-
late these fundamental freedoms is that, by only providing ben-
efits to R&D undertaken in the jurisdiction, they favor 
domestic R&D, which the ECJ has concluded is a form of dis-
crimination based on residence.180 
Although some commentators have suggested that the ECJ 
has been more accepting of certain discriminatory Member 
State direct tax provisions in recent years,181 the ECJ has not 
reversed its existing case law regarding R&D incentives, and 
the precedents that relate directly to R&D incentives make 
clear that an R&D incentive that limits its benefits based on 
the location of the R&D would be inconsistent with the free-
doms provided in the TFEU.182 The EU Member States partici-
pating in the BEPS Project thus had legal support to contend 
that they could not legally implement patent boxes within the 
European Union if those patent boxes only provided benefits 
based on the location of the R&D. Given that EU Member 
States made up half of the countries involved in the BEPS Pro-
ject,183 the parties designing the nexus approach believed that 
they could not require any differential treatment based on the 
 
Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161, ¶ 51 (rejecting the prevention of revenue loss 
as justification); Case C-39/04, Laboratoires Fournier SA v. Direction des 
Vérifications Nationales et Internationales, 2005 E.C.R. I-2057, ¶ 23 (rejecting 
the promotion of research as justification). 
 179. See Case C-254/97, Société Baxter and Others v. Premier Ministre and 
Others, 1999 E.C.R. I-4809; Laboratoires Fournier SA, 2005 E.C.R. I-2057. 
 180. See Laboratoires Fournier SA, 2005 E.C.R. I-2057, ¶¶ 13–14, 19–27; 
Société Baxter and Others, 1999 E.C.R. I-4809, ¶¶ 15–21. 
 181. See generally Maria Hilling, Justifications and Proportionality: An 
Analysis of the ECJ’s Assessment of National Rules for the Prevention of Tax 
Avoidance, 41 INTERTAX 294 (2013) (explaining current trends in ECJ deci-
sions). 
 182. See Laboratoires Fournier SA, 2005 E.C.R. I-2057; Société Baxter and 
Others, 1999 E.C.R. I-4809. 
 183. The countries that were both Member States of the European Union 
and OECD members at the time of the BEPS Project include Austria, Bel-
gium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Although Latvia was not yet a member of the OECD, it was an EU Member 
State, and, as an accession country to the OECD, it was also involved in the 
BEPS Project. Norway and Iceland, members of the European Economic Area, 
and Switzerland, a member of the European Free Trade Association, are also 
OECD members and therefore participated in the BEPS Project. 
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location of R&D. Instead, the OECD had to find a different lens 
through which to view substantial activities, and the FHTP 
chose entities. Rather than treating R&D differently depending 
on where it took place, the entity version of the nexus approach 
therefore treats R&D different depending on who undertook it. 
This in turn led to the entity version distinguishing between re-
lated and unrelated parties rather than between domestic and 
foreign R&D. Outsourcing to all related parties is excluded 
from qualifying expenditures, while outsourcing to all unrelat-
ed parties is included in qualifying expenditures. As stated in 
both the 2014 Progress Report and the 2015 Report, the reason 
for this was that it was assumed that taxpayers would not 
choose to outsource the actual value-generating portion of R&D 
to an unrelated party.184 In terms of acquisitions, since there is 
no way for the EU nexus approach to distinguish between ac-
quisitions where the underlying R&D took place in the jurisdic-
tion and those that are just shifting IP out of another jurisdic-
tion, the cost for all acquisitions must be excluded from 
qualifying expenditures. The focus on entities is thus intended 
to achieve a similar outcome to a focus on the location of the 
R&D, but it must allow for some slippage, where some external 
R&D will be permitted to increase the nexus ratio and some in-
ternal R&D will end up decreasing the nexus ratio, because EU 
law currently prohibits any Member State tax incentive from 
focusing directly on the location of the R&D.185 
The entity version therefore creates more distortions and 
more opportunities for income shifting. Any other version of the 
 
 184. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 29–30; see also ACTION 
5: 2014 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at 32–33. 
 185. Since the entity version of the nexus approach was designed to comply 
with EU law and adopted by the Code of Conduct Group, this Article assumes 
that, if a nexus-compliant patent box is challenged in front of the ECJ, the 
Court will find it not to violate the EU Treaty freedoms or the prohibition on 
state aid. Given the ECJ’s constantly changing view of the scope of Treaty pro-
tections, however, it is not impossible that, despite the OECD’s efforts to de-
sign an approach that is consistent with EU law, a Member State taxpayer 
could challenge it as a violation of Treaty freedoms or the state aid prohibi-
tion. If this were to happen, and if the ECJ were to find that a nexus-
compliant patent box was inconsistent with the TFEU’s protections, this 
would strengthen the arguments in this Article about the detrimental effect of 
EU law on international cooperation. It would also raise fundamental ques-
tions about the interactions between the institutions of the EU, given the 
Commission’s participation in the working party meetings that led to the crea-
tion of the nexus approach, the Code of Conduct Group’s adoption of the ap-
proach, and the Commission’s decision not to initiate state aid investigations 
of patent boxes due to the ongoing debates over the nexus approach. 
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nexus approach that would comply with the EU treaty free-
doms as they are currently understood would, however, not 
prevent base erosion and profit shifting. Since the prohibition 
on discriminating based on the location of R&D means that a 
patent box or other back-end tax regime would be consistent 
with EU treaty freedoms if it were to provide benefits to all 
R&D undertaken throughout the EU, one option for the OECD 
would have been to design the nexus approach so that R&D 
undertaken anywhere in the EU would qualify the resulting in-
come for benefits. This option, however, would itself create an 
incentive for base erosion and profit shifting within the EU, 
since taxpayers could benefit from a patent box in a low-tax 
Member State with limited support for innovation even if they 
had undertaken all the R&D in a different EU Member State 
that had the infrastructure, educational system, trained em-
ployees, and technical support necessary for that R&D. In other 
words, this would permit taxpayers to shift income anywhere 
within the EU, even if the underlying activities had taken place 
in another EU Member State. 
The OECD therefore produced the most robust version of 
the approach that was possible given Member State under-
standings of the EU law constraints. The fact remains, howev-
er, that it was because of EU law that the nexus approach does 
not take the logical approach of focusing on jurisdiction. The 
logic underlying this outcome is the logic of the single market: 
in order to be one supranational market with no internal barri-
ers, Member States cannot prevent the shifting of R&D or in-
come within the EU. Yet, given that the EU institutions still 
have no affirmative authority over direct taxation, this logic 
means that the effect of EU law is in fact to allow and encour-
age base erosion and profit shifting. 
In many ways, EU law underlies the entire BEPS Project. 
In the years leading up to this project, the ECJ struck down or 
limited a wide range of Member State anti-avoidance rules.186 
In general, many anti-avoidance rules treat a payment, trans-
action, or person differently when there is a cross-border ele-
ment. Therefore, a domestic taxpayer who engages in purely 
domestic transactions will be treated differently for tax purpos-
es than a non-resident taxpayer or a domestic taxpayer who 
engages in cross-border transactions. The reason for this is 
 
 186. For a discussion of many of the anti-avoidance rules struck down by 
the ECJ prior to the BEPS Project, see Faulhaber, supra note 174. 
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that, when a transaction or event is purely domestic, the coun-
try imposing taxes knows what happens on both ends of the 
transaction: if a payment is deducted in the hands of the payor, 
then it will be included in the hands of the payee, and the tax-
ing jurisdiction will be assured that it will be taxed at least 
once. When a transaction or event is not purely domestic, how-
ever, the opportunities for non-payment of taxes increase be-
cause one jurisdiction cannot be sure of what is happening in 
the other jurisdiction. For example, if the deduction on the 
payor side was premised on the assumption that the payment 
would be taxed on the payee side, that assumption can no long-
er be supported if the payee is in another jurisdiction. It is 
therefore common to distinguish between domestic and cross-
border transactions in tax legislation.187 
In the European Union, however, the ECJ struck down 
rules that treated domestic and cross-border transactions dif-
ferently.188 With these decisions, Member States lost many tools 
in the fight against tax avoidance. They could not impose with-
holding taxes on dividends or similar payments to other Mem-
ber States, even if those payments were excluded from income 
or otherwise subject to benefits in the recipient Member 
State.189 They could not impose robust controlled foreign com-
pany (CFC) rules on subsidiaries in low-tax Member States to 
prevent income from being shifted into those subsidiaries.190 
They could not limit the deductibility of interest payments to 
other Member States, even if those interest payments were ex-
cluded from income or otherwise subject to benefits in the recip-
ient Member State.191 They also could not have any anti-
 
 187. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 951–965 (2014) (providing rules targeting for-
eign controlled corporations that do not apply to domestic controlled corpora-
tions). 
 188. See Case C-170/05, Denkavit Internationaal BV and Denkavit France 
SARL v. Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 2006 E.C.R. I-
11949, ¶¶ 39–41 (holding that a tax that is imposed on dividends paid to non-
resident parents and that is not imposed on dividends paid to resident parents 
is a violation of the Treaty freedoms). 
 189. See id. 
 190. See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes PLC, Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas Ltd. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-7995, ¶ 75 (hold-
ing that controlled foreign company rules that apply to non-resident subsidiar-
ies and not to resident subsidiaries are a violation of the Treaty freedoms to 
the extent that the subsidiaries to which they apply are not wholly artificial 
arrangements). 
 191. Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 
2002 E.C.R. I-11779 (holding that thin capitalization rules that apply differ-
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avoidance rules that applied to residents of other Member 
States unless those rules were sharply curtailed and applied 
only to wholly artificial entities or transactions.192 Essentially, 
the ECJ barred Member States from policing tax avoidance 
within the European Union because it disallowed rules that 
discriminated against non-resident taxpayers and recognized 
only a very limited exception for the prevention of tax avoid-
ance. This in turn meant that EU law could at least in part ex-
plain many of the patent boxes that most concerned the juris-
dictions that wanted the BEPS Project to target these 
provisions. Countries that opposed patent boxes were most con-
cerned by those that had no limitation on the location of the 
R&D or the identity of the party who undertook the R&D, but 
EU law was what prohibited Member States from limiting their 
patent boxes to income from domestic R&D. 
This meant that, by the time of the BEPS Project, the Eu-
ropean Union had in many ways become a safe space for tax 
avoidance. Taxpayers could structure their transactions such 
that they took advantage of the lack of withholding taxes be-
tween jurisdictions and the lack of anti-avoidance rules within 
EU Member States. While the jurisprudence of the ECJ was 
not the only cause of the base erosion and profit shifting issues 
facing countries at the time of the BEPS Project, it was a key 
factor in creating these issues. This can be seen in the fact that 
several of the BEPS Action Items focused on the very areas 
where the ECJ had struck down or not permitted Member 
State rules as violations of the treaty freedoms. For example, 
Action 2 focused on hybrid arrangements, where the same 
transaction or entity is treated differently in two different ju-
risdictions.193 One way to address these arrangements is for a 
jurisdiction to change its treatment based on the other jurisdic-
tion’s treatment, but this is the type of differential treatment 
that the ECJ has previously not permitted. Action 3 focused on 
CFC rules, which the ECJ had severely limited.194 Action 4 fo-
cused on interest deductibility rules, which the ECJ had also 
 
ently to non-resident shareholders and resident shareholders are a violation of 
the Treaty freedoms). 
 192. See Faulhaber, supra note 174, at 192–94 (defining the “wholly artifi-
cial arrangements doctrine,” according to which the ECJ only permits Member 
States to justify a discriminatory measure as a means to prevent tax avoid-
ance if that measure targets only wholly artificial arrangements). 
 193. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 15–16. 
 194. Id. at 16–17. 
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limited.195 In effect, these Action Items highlight that one goal 
of the BEPS Project was to overcome the limits that had been 
placed on anti-avoidance efforts by the ECJ. 
And yet, as shown by the nexus approach, efforts to over-
come the ECJ’s jurisprudence were themselves thwarted by 
Member State understandings of the Court’s interpretation of 
the freedoms protected in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. The nexus approach is therefore striking in 
that it did work within the confines of EU law to address a 
problem to which EU law contributed, but it also highlights 
that the BEPS Project was hampered from the start, given that 
many Action Items were limited in what they could achieve 
based on the legal constraints that applied to EU Member 
States. This was true for several other Action Items as well. 
The Reports on Action 3 and Action 4, for example, included 
several pages that explained the restrictions imposed by the 
EU treaty freedoms and made clear that no recommendations 
in those Reports should be interpreted as requiring Member 
States to violate those freedoms.196 Given that those freedoms 
were the very ones that led to weak CFC and interest deducti-
bility rules in the first place, the fact that the OECD had to 
work within those constraints limited the degree to which the 
OECD could advocate rules that would eliminate tax avoidance 
opportunities. 
EU law therefore limited the ability of Member States to 
police tax avoidance both before and after the BEPS Project. 
The OECD did propose recommendations and requirements 
that went as far as possible toward combating tax avoidance 
within the constraints of existing EU law, but these constraints 
prevented it from adopting the most robust possible anti-
avoidance rules. This effect of EU law is particularly clear with-
in the context of the work on patent boxes, because this is the 
one area where the OECD’s outputs include both the desired 
outcome and the more limited outcome that is necessary to 
comply with EU constraints. By including the location version 
but explicitly limiting this version to non-EU countries, the 
OECD made clear that the entity version was a deviation from 
 
 195. Id. at 17–18. 
 196. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DESIGNING EFFEC-
TIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES, ACTION 3: 2015 FINAL REPORT 
17–18 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 3: 2015 FINAL REPORT] (discussing the con-
straints placed on CFC rules by EU law). 
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the version that could have been proposed in the absence of EU 
law. 
Although the ECJ’s interpretations of the treaty freedoms 
limited the outcomes under the BEPS Project, this was not the 
only interaction between EU institutions and the BEPS Project. 
Other EU institutions and groupings, including the Council, 
the Commission, and the Code of Conduct Group, in fact con-
tributed to strengthening the outputs under the BEPS Project. 
For example, in the context of Action 2, which dealt with hybrid 
mismatch arrangements, some Member States had interpreted 
a piece of EU legislation as preventing the types of rules that 
were proposed in the Action 2 report.197 This legislation, known 
as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, prevents Member States 
from imposing taxes on certain intragroup payments.198 The Ac-
tion 2 report, however, included several recommendations, one 
of which was the imposition of a tax on intragroup payments. 
This recommendation said that, if a subsidiary had been per-
mitted to deduct a payment to a parent, the parent country 
could then impose taxes on that payment rather than allowing 
it to escape taxation.199 Some observers saw this and other Ac-
tion 2 recommendations as violating the Directive. In response 
to this concern, the Council of the European Union approved 
two amendments to the Directive in 2014 and 2015. The first of 
these amendments directly supported Action 2 by requiring 
that a parent impose a tax on a payment to the extent that it 
had been deducted in a subsidiary resident in another Member 
State.200 The second amendment then made it easier for Mem-
ber States to adopt other Action 2 recommendations that may 
also have run afoul of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, thereby 
eliminating an EU legal constraint that would have significant-
ly weakened the effectiveness of the BEPS Project’s recommen-
dations.201 
 
 197. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEUTRALISING THE EF-
FECT OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, ACTION 2: 2015 FINAL REPORT 
(2015) [hereinafter ACTION 2: 2015 FINAL REPORT]. 
 198. Council Directive 2011/96, 2011 O.J. (L 345) 9 (EU). 
 199. Id. at 15–20. 
 200. Council Directive 2014/86, art. 4, 2014, O.J. (L 219) (EU). 
 201. See Council Directive 2015/121, 2015 O.J. (L 21) (EU) (adding an anti-
abuse provision to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive that would instruct gov-
ernments not to grant benefits under the directive to arrangements designed 
to obtain a tax advantage); European Council Press Release ST 15103/14, Par-
ent-Subsidiary Directive: Council Agrees To Add Anti-Abuse Clause Against 
Corporate Tax Avoidance (Dec. 9, 2014). 
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Another example of cooperation between the European Un-
ion and the OECD can be seen in the Code of Conduct Group’s 
adoption of the nexus approach. In 1997, the EU established 
the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, which targeted 
harmful tax practices within the EU.202 Since then, the Code of 
Conduct Group has been charged with eliminating these prac-
tices, and it does so by applying five criteria when assessing re-
gimes in Member States: (i) “whether advantages are accorded 
only to non-residents or in respect of transactions carried out 
with non-residents”; (ii) “whether advantages are ring-fenced 
from the domestic market”; (iii) “whether advantages are 
granted even without any real economic activity and substan-
tial economic presence within the Member State offering such 
tax advantages”; (iv) “whether the rules for profit determina-
tion . . . depart[] from internationally accepted principles”; and 
(v) “whether the tax measures lack transparency.”203 
More recently, the Code of Conduct Group opened discus-
sions on Member State patent boxes, many of which were later 
assessed by the FHTP. These discussions took place in the con-
text of the Group’s discussions of the third criterion, which re-
quires that advantages only be granted where there is real eco-
nomic activity and a substantial economic presence within the 
Member States offering the tax advantage.204 On November 20, 
2014, just after Germany and the UK released their compro-
mise proposal on the nexus approach, the Code of Conduct 
Group announced that it was adopting the entity version of the 
nexus approach as developed by the FHTP in the context of the 
BEPS Project.205 
This adoption increased pressure on Member States who 
were participating in the BEPS Project to adopt the nexus ap-
proach themselves, since they would now be subject to it at the 
 
 202. Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 Dec. 1997, 1997 O.J. 
98/C. 
 203. Id. §§ B(1)–(5). 
 204. Id. § B(3). On its face, the third factor requires that substantial activi-
ties occur within the jurisdiction granting tax benefits, but the Code of Con-
duct Group does not appear to have expressed concerns that this requirement 
is inconsistent with the ECJ’s tax avoidance jurisprudence. 
 205. Van der Made, supra note 114. In the media, there was some confu-
sion about what organization had developed the nexus approach. See, e.g., Liz 
Loxton, Closing the Loophole: Tax Breaks on IP and Patents, ECONOMIA (Feb. 
5, 2015), http://economia.icaew.com/finance/february-2015/closing-the-double 
-irish-loophole (quoting a lawyer as referring to “the EU’s Forum on Harmful 
Tax Practices,” which does not exist). This was developed by the FHTP and 
adopted by both the FHTP and the Code of Conduct Group. 
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EU level regardless of whether or not the OECD adopted it. 
Therefore, opposing the nexus approach no longer provided any 
benefit to these Member States. This effect can be seen by the 
fact that, before the FHTP assessed any patent boxes, the Code 
of Conduct Group assessed all Member State patent boxes and 
concluded that none of them were compatible with the nexus 
approach.206 Furthermore, this expanded the scope of the nexus 
approach by subjecting all twenty-eight EU Member States, in-
cluding those that were not members of the OECD or G-20, to 
assessment under the nexus approach. In practical terms, this 
meant that the Cyprus and Malta patent boxes, both of which 
applied rates of 2.5% or less and neither of which would have 
been considered under the OECD’s nexus approach since nei-
ther Cyprus nor Malta is an OECD or G-20 member, were now 
subject to the nexus approach. 
The institutions of the European Union therefore have con-
tributed to the success of the BEPS Project by reforming EU-
level legislation and adopting the nexus approach in the Code 
of Conduct Group. The Commission took part as an observer in 
many of the working party and FHTP meetings that led to the 
OECD’s recommendations, and it also stepped back from its 
2013 review of patent boxes as state aid.207 What the two ver-
sions of the nexus approach highlight, however, is that, despite 
these positive contributions on the part of other EU institu-
tions, EU law remains a significant constraint on the ability of 
Member States to police tax avoidance. The ECJ’s jurispru-
dence created opportunities for the base erosion and profit 
shifting that led to the BEPS Project, and it also limited the ef-
forts by Member States and other OECD and G-20 countries to 
curtail these opportunities during the BEPS Project. While this 
is not necessarily the intention of the Court, which achieves 
this result merely by interpreting the Treaty freedoms to pre-
vent discrimination against non-residents, the result of this in-
terpretation is to create a welcoming environment for tax 
avoidance within the European Union. 
That effect is worrisome enough when it just constrains the 
ability of Member States to police tax avoidance. As will be dis-
cussed next in this Part, however, the BEPS Project expanded 
the impact of the ECJ’s pro-avoidance jurisprudence so that it 
 
 206. Van der Made, supra note 114. 
 207. See, e.g., Ajay Gupta, Is the EU Preparing for Failure on BEPS?, 79 
TAX NOTES INT’L 815, 815 (2015). 
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is now not only Member States who are constrained in what 
they are able to do to prevent tax avoidance. Instead, the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence has now made it harder for even non-EU coun-
tries to police tax avoidance and curtail tax competition. 
EU Member States were not the only countries that were 
party to the BEPS Project. Although they made up half of the 
forty-four participants, the other half of the countries taking 
part in the BEPS Project were not EU Member States. But, as 
shown above, the results of the BEPS Project were constrained 
by legal requirements that applied only to those twenty-two 
Member States. This in turn illustrates an important new de-
velopment in international relations: it is no longer just the 
Member States of the European Union who are subject to EU 
law constraints. These constraints now affect countries outside 
the European Union as well. 
B. THE LUXEMBOURG EFFECT 
Although the two different versions of the nexus approach 
mean that EU Member States are the only countries that must 
implement the entity version, they do not mean that other 
countries cannot implement the entity version. Instead, non-
EU countries are free to adopt either the entity version or the 
location version (or a mix of the two). And even though the lo-
cation version is more consistent with the goals of Action 5, it is 
likely that many jurisdictions even outside the European Union 
will end up implementing the entity version of the nexus ap-
proach. One of the main reasons for implementing a patent box 
is to compete with other countries for both revenue and R&D 
activity. Therefore, when countries have a choice between a tax 
incentive that will be more attractive to taxpayers or one that 
will be less attractive because it provides fewer benefits, many 
countries will choose the former. The entity version of the nex-
us approach allows for patent boxes that are generally more at-
tractive to taxpayers because they are likely to allow some ex-
traterritorial R&D to qualify for benefits, while the location 
version does not.208 That said, the entity version also creates 
 
 208. This is partly because of the treatment of branches under the entity 
approach and partly because of the treatment of unrelated party outsourcing, 
which is included in qualifying expenditures under the entity approach even if 
the unrelated party is outside the jurisdiction providing benefits. The treat-
ment of acquisitions is less generous under the entity version, so this may 
overall end up being less generous. Jurisdictions could, however, choose to 
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more complexity by requiring greater tracking and tracing and 
creating pressures against outsourcing and acquisition, so some 
non-EU countries may adopt the entity version, while others 
may incorporate some combination of the entity version and the 
location version, such as a patent box that focuses on which en-
tity undertook the R&D but then adopts jurisdiction-focused 
rules on acquisitions. 
Even if some non-EU countries adopt a purely jurisdiction-
focused patent box, however, the mere existence of the entity 
version of the nexus approach changes the competitive envi-
ronment in which countries are deciding to adopt patent boxes. 
The fact that the EU Member States were able to shape the 
nexus approach so that it focused on entities rather than loca-
tion means that taxpayers now know that, at least in the Euro-
pean Union, patent boxes will allow for some degree of income 
shifting, where non-local R&D can qualify income for benefits. 
This in turn means that non-EU jurisdictions that see them-
selves competing with EU jurisdictions for taxpayers and in-
come will feel pressure to allow similar slippage in their own 
patent boxes. 
EU law, therefore, no longer has an effect just on the 
Member States of the European Union. Instead, when com-
bined with the competitive pressures facing countries as they 
design tax incentives, it changes the legal landscape for other 
countries. In other words, when EU Member States are part of 
an international or transnational negotiation, EU law shapes 
those negotiations and can have an effect on the law that ap-
plies in non-EU countries as well as in Member States. This 
lesson can be seen in some of the other outputs from the BEPS 
Project as well. In the context of CFC rules, for example, the 
apparent goal of including Action 3 was to push for more robust 
CFC rules worldwide.209 The outcome from Action 3, however, 
only set out non-binding recommendations for countries that 
wished to adopt CFC rules, and it expressly acknowledged that 
these rules could not be designed in a way that was incon-
sistent with the EU treaty freedoms.210 Given that EU treaty 
 
adopt the entity version as it applies to outsourcing and the location version as 
it applies to acquisition. 
 209. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82, at 16 (outlining the positive ef-
fects of CFC rules). 
 210. ACTION 3: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 196, at 17 (stating that “EU 
Member States will need to ensure that they make choices that are consistent 
with EU law”). 
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freedoms were what had weakened Member State CFC rules to 
begin with, this acknowledgment did not offer much comfort to 
observers who had hoped that the BEPS Project would lead to 
stronger rules than those permitted under the ECJ’s jurispru-
dence.211  
Examples of this larger effect of EU law can also be found 
outside of the BEPS Project. In cases such as Gottardo212 and 
Open Skies,213 the ECJ had previously found that treaties with 
third countries that provided more favorable benefits to resi-
dents of one Member State compared to residents of another 
Member State were inconsistent with the Treaty freedoms.214 
The Commission interpreted these findings to mean that limi-
tation on benefits clauses in tax treaties with third countries 
were also inconsistent with the Treaty freedoms.215 If the Com-
mission’s current infringement decision against the Nether-
lands for its treaty with Japan (which contains a limitation on 
benefits provision that the Commission believes to violate the 
Treaty freedoms) is not challenged or overturned, this provides 
yet another example of the Luxembourg Effect, pursuant to 
which third countries have less freedom in how they design tax 
treaties to ensure that their benefits are limited to residents of 
EU treaty partners.216 
 
 211. The Action 3 Final Report did suggest that Member States could de-
sign their CFC rules to be more robust than what they currently had. This 
recommendation suggested that, while most Member State CFC rules were 
designed to target only wholly artificial arrangements, they could also be de-
signed to target a wider variety of subsidiaries as long as that included both 
resident and non-resident subsidiaries, or they could be designed to target 
“partly wholly artificial” arrangements, or they could be designed to apply 
more broadly so long as they could be justified by a need to maintain the bal-
anced allocation of taxing power. See id. at 17–18. All these suggestions were 
placed within the constraint of EU law, however, and the fact that the Action 
3 Final Report did not require any Member States to implement CFC rules 
means that these design options will not change the environment for CFC 
rules unless Member States affirmatively want to test the limits of EU law. 
 212. Case C-55/00, Elide Gottardo v. Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza 
Sociale (INPS), 2002 E.C.R. I-413. 
 213. Case C-466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-9427. 
 214. Elide Gottardo, 2002 E.C.R. I-413, ¶ 39; Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 
2002 E.C.R. I-9427, ¶ 61. 
 215. See Mindy Herzfeld, The EU’s Other Smoking Gun, 84 TAX NOTES 
INT’L, 12, 12–13 (2016). 
 216. This also at least partly explains why the minimum standard de-
signed under Action 6 of the BEPS Project did not specify one required treaty 
provision but instead required countries to implement either a limitation on 
benefits clause or a principal purpose test. As was true in the context of patent 
boxes, the OECD did not feel that it could issue a report that recommended 
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EU law therefore has a much broader reach than has pre-
viously been acknowledged. Although many academics have 
discussed the internal inconsistencies of the ECJ’s direct tax 
jurisprudence217 and the effect of this case law on Member State 
tax provisions,218 the nexus approach shows that the ECJ’s di-
rect tax jurisprudence has an effect on tax provisions outside of 
the European Union. This means that the European Union and 
its court system are not only important for EU legal experts, 
but instead for all countries that are negotiating with the EU 
or competing with the EU for taxpayers, income, or anything 
else. 
In an earlier article,219 Anu Bradford identified what she 
referred to as the “Brussels Effect,” whereby the European Un-
ion has raised the floor for regulatory standards through mar-
ket harmonization.220 In the process identified by Bradford, 
standards in areas where the EU has regulatory authority 
(such as antitrust law, privacy, human health, and the envi-
ronment)221 have been heightened even outside the EU because 
the EU’s higher regulatory standards have pushed up all regu-
latory standards due to market pressures.222 
This Article introduces the Luxembourg Effect (so named 
because the primary seat of the European Court of Justice is 
Luxembourg).223 In an area such as direct taxation, where the 
 
only a limitation on benefits clause if some Member States understood such a 
clause to be inconsistent with the Treaty freedoms. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAP-
PROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6: 2015 FINAL REPORT 14 (2015) (ac-
knowledging that “some countries may have constitutional restrictions or con-
cerns based on EU law that prevent them from adopting the exact wording of 
the model provisions that are recommended in this report”). 
 217. See, e.g., Graetz & Warren, supra note 25; Mason & Knoll, supra note 
25. 
 218. See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 174. 
 219. Bradford, supra note 30. 
 220. Id. at 3. Bradford’s article builds on the concepts of the California Ef-
fect and the Delaware Effect. Under the California Effect, California is able to 
heighten regulatory standards and norms in certain contexts. Under the Del-
aware Effect, Delaware has the ability to lower such standards and norms in 
other contexts. See id. at 5. The Brussels Effect is the international version of 
the California Effect. The Luxembourg Effect, which I introduce here, is in 
some ways the international version of the Delaware Effect. 
 221. Id. at 19. 
 222. Id. at 3. 
 223. While the Commission and other EU institutions are located in Brus-
sels, the primary seat of the European Court of Justice is Luxembourg. See 
BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 359 (2005). 
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EU institutions do not have any regulatory authority but the 
ECJ does have jurisdiction,224 the EU cannot raise international 
standards through market convergence, so the Brussels Effect 
does not apply. What the nexus approach shows us, however, is 
that the opposite outcome arises. Instead of just leaving indi-
vidual country standards as is, the ECJ reduces these stand-
ards when it finds that individual Member State provisions are 
inconsistent with the Treaty freedoms. These reduced stand-
ards are then exported through international competition. The 
reduced ability of Member States to police tax avoidance there-
fore does not just affect Member States, but it changes the en-
tire competitive landscape and creates pressures for other 
countries to also reduce their anti-avoidance standards. There-
fore, while the Brussels Effect leads to upward pressure on 
regulatory standards, the Luxembourg Effect leads to down-
ward pressure on international standards.225 
This effect was made particularly clear in the context of 
the BEPS Project, since the goal of that project was to raise in-
ternational standards limiting tax avoidance.226 In many of the 
Action Items, the OECD and G-20 achieved this goal: they in-
troduced rules to combat hybrid mismatch arrangements, 
which very few countries had even attempted to prevent;227 they 
made it harder to avoid PE status;228 they established new re-
quirements for exchanging and collecting taxpayer infor-
mation;229 and they modified transfer pricing guidance to allo-
cate more income to jurisdictions where value creation took 
 
 224. Bradford, supra note 30, at 59 (acknowledging that the Brussels Effect 
does not apply in areas where the “missing regulatory propensity . . . reflects a 
preference for heterogeneity within the EU” and identifying direct taxation as 
one such area).  
 225. This Article views greater opportunities for tax avoidance as examples 
of reduced standards and downward pressure. Although advocates for patent 
boxes may disagree with this characterization, the fact that the Luxembourg 
Effect meant that the OECD and the FHTP agreed to an approach that al-
lowed more jurisdictional income shifting than otherwise would have been 
consistent with the stated goals of Action 5 supports the view of this effect as 
leading to reduced standards and downward pressure. 
 226. See BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82. 
 227. ACTION 2: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 197. 
 228. ACTION 7 FINAL REPORT, supra note 166. 
 229. ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 45–60 (setting out 
rules for the spontaneous exchange of rulings); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV., TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY RE-
PORTING, ACTION 13: 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 13: 2015 
FINAL REPORT]. 
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place.230 These outcomes could be achieved either because the 
ECJ had not yet decided cases in that specific area or because 
the area appeared to fall outside the ECJ’s existing jurispru-
dence. In the context of hybrid mismatch arrangements, for ex-
ample, the Council’s amendment to the Parent-Subsidiary Di-
rective was sufficient to remove at least some limits on Member 
State action.231 PE status was a change made to bilateral trea-
ties,232 and, although the ECJ has previously considered cases 
challenging treaty provisions, the establishment of PE status is 
further from the ECJ’s jurisprudence than an individual do-
mestic law affecting cross-border taxation. Exchange of infor-
mation was outside the scope of the ECJ’s jurisprudence be-
cause this information was required of all taxpayers, and the 
transfer pricing changes were just made in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, which the ECJ sees as generally consistent 
with EU law.233 
But in areas where the ECJ had already ruled on the in-
consistency of Member State rules with EU law, the OECD 
members were not able to agree to raise international stand-
ards as high as they could have in the absence of EU law. EU 
law therefore has an effect that goes beyond the borders of the 
EU—and Bradford’s arguments about regulatory convergence 
go beyond the borders of the EU’s regulatory authority. Regula-
tory convergence, in fact, happens in reverse in direct taxation 
because this is an area where the EU has no regulatory author-
ity, the ECJ has struck down the ability of Member States to 
pass legislation, and countries gain a competitive advantage by 
lowering their own standards.234 Member States therefore face a 
legislative and regulatory vacuum, where they cannot imple-
ment their chosen provisions but no EU institution has the au-
thority to replace those provisions with EU-wide harmoniza-
tion. This vacuum in turn affects countries outside the EU 
because the reduced standards in the European Union create a 
lower bar against which to compete and thus reduce interna-
tional standards. 
 
 230. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING 
OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, ACTIONS 8–10: 2015 FINAL REPORTS (2015) 
[hereinafter ACTIONS 8–10: 2015 FINAL REPORTS]. 
 231. See ACTION 2: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 197. 
 232. See ACTION 7 FINAL REPORT, supra note 166. 
 233. See ACTION 13: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 229; ACTIONS 8–10: 
2015 FINAL REPORTS, supra note 230. 
 234. Bradford, supra note 30, at 59. 
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In order for the Luxembourg Effect to apply, the nexus ap-
proach suggests that three requirements must be met. First, 
the EU institutions cannot have separate regulatory compe-
tence in the area. In other words, the area must be one where 
the unanimous consent of the Member States of the European 
Union is required for any legislation. This requirement is met 
in the direct tax area, as well as several other areas, including 
the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), family 
law, social security and social protection, and the granting of 
rights to EU citizens.235 Second, the European Court of Justice 
must have jurisdiction over cases in this area. Although this 
second requirement is also met in the direct tax area, it is not 
met in all areas that require unanimous consent. The ECJ does 
not, for example, have jurisdiction over cases involving the 
CFSP.236 Finally, the area must be one in which countries gain 
a competitive advantage by reducing standards. This third re-
quirement is met in the direct tax area, since countries believe 
that they benefit from making it easier to engage in income 
shifting transactions. This may not, however, be true in many 
of the other areas that meet the first two requirements. In the 
area of family law, for example, the regulatory vacuum also ex-
ists because Member States have retained the unanimity re-
quirement over legislation in this area237 and the ECJ has 
struck down Member State laws in this area.238 The effect of the 
 
 235. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union art. 42(4), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 38 (discussing common foreign and security policy); Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art. 21(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
57 (regarding social security); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion art. 25, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 58 (regarding rights for EU citi-
zens); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 81(3), Oct. 26, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 79 (discussing family law measures). 
 236. Treaty on European Union art. 24(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
13 (noting that, although the ECJ does not have jurisdiction over cases involv-
ing CFSP, it does have jurisdiction “to monitor compliance with Article 40 of 
this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by 
the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union”). 
 237. Note that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does 
provide for the possibility of Member States agreeing to allow some family law 
legislation to be approved by qualified majority voting, but any such agree-
ment requires the unanimous consent of all Member States. Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art. 81(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 
47. 
 238. See, e.g., Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu v. Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dep’t, 2004 E.C.R. l-9925 (interpreting the right of residence to 
mean that petitioners had the right to reside in one Member State that did not 
recognize birthright citizenship when their only claim to this right was birth-
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ECJ’s jurisprudence has again been to lower regulatory stand-
ards in this area, but non-EU countries may not have had their 
own family law legislation affected by reduced standards with-
in the European Union because competition in this area does 
not focus on reduced standards. This third requirement means 
that the Luxembourg Effect is limited to the few areas such as 
direct taxation where lower standards are beneficial to coun-
tries from a competitive perspective. Although that means that 
the Luxembourg Effect may not be as common as the Brussels 
Effect, the Luxembourg Effect is still significant in that it illus-
trates the long reach of EU law in the direct tax area and the 
impact that the ECJ’s decisions can have beyond the borders of 
the European Union. 
The third requirement also highlights the political story 
underlying the development of the two versions of the nexus 
approach—and it highlights a cost of the UK’s recent “Brexit” 
vote that has not previously been discussed. The third require-
ment of the Luxembourg Effect is that countries must receive a 
competitive advantage from a reduction in standards. This im-
plies that many of the countries debating the nexus approach 
were aware that a version of the approach that allowed for 
some out-of-jurisdiction R&D to qualify for reduced rates would 
allow countries that adopted a patent box that complied with 
such a version to continue to attract income from other jurisdic-
tions. The limits imposed by EU law therefore provided a con-
venient excuse for those countries that already had existing pa-
tent boxes and that wanted to ensure that these regimes could 
continue to allow some degree of jurisdictional income shifting. 
While the thirty percent uplift that was agreed to by the UK (a 
country with a patent box that had previously allowed for ju-
risdictional income shifting)239 and Germany (a country that pub-
licly stated that it wanted to eliminate all patent boxes)240 already 
achieved this goal and allowed countries to receive benefits for 
at least some of their out-of-jurisdiction R&D, the entity ver-
sion also contributed to the lowering of anti-avoidance stand-
ards. The Luxembourg Effect illustrates that, despite public 
complaints by EU Member State politicians about the many 
limitations imposed on them by EU law, these supposed limita-
tions may, in fact, be more of a shield that protects Member 
States’ more pro-avoidance direct tax rules from challenge and, 
 
right citizenship granted in another Member State). 
 239. See FEB. 2015 AGREEMENT, supra note 115. 
 240. See Houlder & Peel, supra note 54. 
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in turn, sets the bar progressively lower for anti-avoidance 
rules worldwide. 
The Member States’ use of EU law as a shield is also illus-
trated by the fact that the OECD did not propose that all pa-
tent boxes be eliminated. Such a proposal would have been con-
sistent with both Action 5, which did not foreclose the 
possibility of eliminating patent boxes entirely, and EU law, 
which says nothing that could be interpreted to require Mem-
ber States to have patent boxes. The OECD did not propose 
eliminating patent boxes, however, because many Member 
States came to the BEPS Project with patent boxes that they 
did not want to eliminate. Their deference to EU law, therefore, 
only went so far, and they were unwilling to allow EU law to be 
used to strike down their patent boxes entirely. 
Another illustration of how Member States used EU law to 
shield them from proposals that would make their patent boxes 
less competitive and more restrictive can be seen in the fact 
that many commentators had suggested that the ECJ appeared 
to be moving away from its most pro-avoidance interpretation 
of the treaties.241 Member States therefore could have used the 
BEPS Project as a moment to challenge the ECJ’s jurispru-
dence, and they could have limited the Action 5 proposal to the 
location version of the nexus approach. Any Member States 
that implemented a patent box consistent with that approach 
would then have to be willing to defend the box as consistent 
with EU law, which would require them to argue that the 
BEPS Project, which included twenty-two of the twenty-eight 
Member States of the EU, had redefined tax avoidance and 
that rules that were designed to combat tax avoidance as de-
fined by the project were justified under EU law. While many 
observers may have hoped that the Member States would do 
just that, their unwillingness to do so illustrates that at least 
some Member States were willing to use the ECJ’s pro-
avoidance jurisprudence as a shield to protect their less restric-
tive patent boxes. 
This political story adds another dimension to the effects of 
the recent UK referendum in favor of leaving the European Un-
ion. Although politicians throughout the United Kingdom were 
outspoken about the ways in which the European Union lim-
ited their freedom in designing domestic law,242 the Luxem-
 
 241. See, e.g., Hilling, supra note 181. 
 242. See, e.g., David Cameron, The EU Is Not Working and We Will Change 
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bourg Effect highlights that, at least in the direct tax area, the 
United Kingdom may have benefited from the political cover 
provided by the limits imposed by EU law. This is particularly 
evident in the context of patent boxes. Prior to the BEPS Pro-
ject, politicians from other countries directly criticized the UK 
patent box as an example of unfair tax competition.243 The 
BEPS Project did not, however, eliminate the UK’s patent 
box.244 It instead allowed the United Kingdom to keep a patent 
box so long as it was consistent with the entity version of the 
nexus approach.245 The United Kingdom and other EU Member 
States with patent boxes were therefore able to use EU law as 
a shield to protect a rule that otherwise may have been elimi-
nated. If the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State of 
the European Union, however, it will be in the same position as 
all the other non-EU countries that are subject to the Luxem-
bourg Effect. In other words, even though a majority of its elec-
torate voted to no longer be subject to the laws of the European 
Union, the United Kingdom will still be faced with a competi-
tive landscape shaped by this very law, but it will no longer be 
able to use this law as a political shield to protect its own do-
mestic interests. 
This means that, while the debates over the internal con-
sistency of the ECJ’s direct tax jurisprudence are important 
and relevant, they are not the only debates that should be tak-
ing place around this case law. Instead, there needs to also be a 
focus on how this jurisprudence affects countries beyond the 
EU as well as Member States and a discussion of what can be 
done. The following Part considers some possible answers, but, 
as shown by the nexus approach and other outcomes of the 
BEPS Project, most of these answers require the ECJ and the 
other EU institutions to limit these constraints, which they 
have thus far been unwilling to do. 
 
It, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/ 
eureferendum/10700644/David-Cameron-the-EU-is-not-working-and-we-will 
-change-it.html (sharing concerns that “the degree of European interference in 
our everyday life [is] excessive”). 
 243. See, e.g., Houlder & Peel, supra note 54. 
 244. See ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 6. 
 245. Id. at 34–35. The UK and all other jurisdictions with existing patent 
boxes were also permitted to continue to provide benefits until 2021 to taxpay-
ers that had previously benefited from the existing patent box. 
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III.  POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE LUXEMBOURG 
EFFECT   
As outlined above, the long reach of the ECJ’s direct tax ju-
risprudence exists because of the combination of (i) the EU in-
stitutions’ lack of authority to pass direct tax legislation with-
out the unanimous support of Member States; (ii) the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the freedoms protected by 
the TFEU; and (iii) the competitive advantage of having lower 
standards. This Part briefly considers responses to the Luxem-
bourg Effect that would address each of these requirements, 
although it acknowledges that many of these responses are un-
likely to succeed in the short term, so the first step toward ad-
dressing the Luxembourg Effect must be raising awareness of 
its existence. 
A. RESPONSES TO THE EU INSTITUTIONS’ LACK OF REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY 
One way to address the Luxembourg Effect in the field of 
direct taxation would be to grant the EU institutions the com-
petence to pass EU-level directives or regulations in this area 
without the unanimous consent of the Member States. In other 
words, direct tax could become one of the many areas where on-
ly qualified majority voting (QMV) is required for EU-level leg-
islation.246 Moving direct taxation to QMV was considered dur-
ing the debates over the EU Constitution in 2003 and 2004,247 
but this proposal was not incorporated into the final version,248 
so it is unlikely that such a reform will be achieved in the short 
term. Moreover, even if the EU institutions had the authority 
 
 246. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 238(3)(a), 
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (setting out the requirements for qualified 
majority voting). 
 247. See Opinion of the Commission, Pursuant to Article 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the Conference of Representatives of the Member States’ 
Governments Convened to Revise the Treaties, at 7, COM (2003) 548 final 
(Sept. 17, 2003) (proposing that the Constitution allow for QMV in areas such 
as “taxation in connection with the operation of the internal market, i.e. mod-
ernising and simplifying existing legislation, administrative cooperation, com-
bating fraud or tax evasion, measures relating to tax bases for companies, but 
not including tax rates; the aspects of free circulation of capital linked to the 
fight against fraud; taxation in respect of the environment; certain aspects of 
social security; certain measures concerning passports; and the European pub-
lic prosecutor’s role in safeguarding the Union’s financial interests”). 
 248. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 
O.J. (C 310) 01. Note that this treaty was not ratified after voters in France 
and the Netherlands voted against it in 2005. 
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to pass direct tax legislation, this legislation would still need to 
conform to the ECJ’s interpretations of the treaty freedoms, so 
this would still not remove the downward pressure on direct 
tax standards. This can be illustrated by the recent work done 
by the Commission and Council on an Anti-Tax Avoidance 
(ATA) Directive.249 Although this Directive at first appears to be 
a move away from the reduced standards that led to the Lux-
embourg Effect, it in fact illustrates just how difficult it will be 
for Member States to offset the Luxembourg Effect through po-
litical agreement since it is still subject to the Treaty freedoms 
as interpreted by the ECJ. Therefore, even though it includes 
proposals for an interest deductibility rule, an exit tax, a gen-
eral anti-abuse rule, a CFC rule, and a hybrid mismatch rule,250 
many of these rules are still constrained by the ECJ’s jurispru-
dence. Consistent with Lankhorst-Hohorst,251 for example, the 
interest deductibility rule is not a thin capitalization rule that 
focuses only on interest paid to foreign parents but is instead a 
jurisdiction-neutral rule that applies based on a proportionate 
calculation.252 Consistent with National Grid Industries,253 the 
exit tax is not an immediate penalty but instead a tax that may 
be extended over five years for transfers within the EEA.254 
Moreover, both the general anti-abuse rule and the CFC rule 
 
 249. Council Directive 2016/1164 of July 12, 2016, Laying Down Rules 
Against Tax Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the 
Internal Market, annex I (EU) [hereinafter ATA Directive]. 
 250. Id. at ch. II, arts. 4–9. 
 251. Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. I-
11779. 
 252. ATA Directive, supra note 249, at ch. II, art. 4. Interest deductibility 
rules in general are intended to prevent taxpayers from taking excess interest 
deductions, and such deductions generally are more valuable when the inter-
est payment being deducted was paid to a foreign entity, since the recipient 
will not necessarily be taxed on the interest payment at the same rate that the 
payor can deduct the payment. Therefore, many interest deductibility rules 
take the form of a thin capitalization rule (i.e., a rule that applies only to high-
ly leveraged taxpayers) that applies only when interest payments are made to 
foreign or other non-taxable entities. However, such a rule treats interest 
payments differently depending on whether they were paid to a resident recip-
ient or a foreign recipient, so it raises EU law concerns. 
 253. C-371/10, Nat’l Grid Indus. BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam, 2011 E.C.R. I-12273. 
 254. ATA Directive, supra note 249, at ch. II, art. 5. An exit tax applies 
when a company leaves one jurisdiction for another. Since it is triggered only 
when a taxpayer leaves a jurisdiction and establishes in a different jurisdic-
tion, it does not apply equally to resident companies that are remaining resi-
dent companies and those that are becoming foreign companies, so it raises 
EU law concerns. 
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adopt the terminology of Cadbury Schweppes255 and apply only 
to “non-genuine arrangements.”256 Therefore, although the ATA 
Directive may lead more Member States to have anti-avoidance 
rules, many of these rules will not go any further toward pre-
venting tax avoidance than the rules that already exist in 
Member States since even EU-level legislation is restricted by 
the pro-avoidance jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
B. RESPONSES TO THE ECJ’S JURISDICTION OVER DIRECT TAX 
CASES 
EU-wide legislation thus does not seem to be the answer to 
the current stalemate since even that would be subject to the 
treaty freedoms. What, then, could be done at the ECJ level to 
address this situation? One option would be for Member States 
to amend the treaties to restrict the ECJ’s jurisdiction over di-
rect tax cases. Member States have, however, previously con-
sidered and rejected the idea of rescinding the ECJ’s jurisdic-
tion over direct tax cases,257 so this is again unlikely to be an 
option in the short term. 
A second option would be for the Court itself to change its 
approach to deciding direct tax cases. It could, for example, 
adopt a more deferential approach when deciding cases involv-
ing Member State implementation of internationally agreed 
 
 255. Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 
2006 E.C.R. I-7995. 
 256. ATA Directive, supra note 249, at ch. II, art. 6(1), art. 7(2)(b). This is a 
blanket limitation for the general anti-avoidance rule. The CFC rule allows 
Member States either to apply a blanket rule that applies to all non-genuine 
arrangements or to apply their rules only to CFCs that do not “carr[y] on a 
substantive economic activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and prem-
ises, as evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances.” For Member States 
that choose the latter path, they can apply their CFC rules more broadly to 
subsidiaries in non-EEA countries. Both of these were designed to be con-
sistent with Cadbury Schweppes, which focused on the treatment of subsidiar-
ies within the European Union (and, by extension, the EEA). For more on 
what the ECJ believes the terms “non-genuine arrangements” and “wholly ar-
tificial arrangements” encompass, see Faulhaber, supra note 174. The ECJ’s 
argument in Cadbury Schweppes was that CFC rules that by definition ap-
plied only to foreign subsidiaries were discriminatory, but they could be justi-
fied as preventing tax avoidance if they only applied to subsidiaries that were 
“wholly artificial.” See id. The ATA Directive therefore adopted this logic to 
limit both CFC rules and general anti-avoidance rules so that they only apply 
narrowly to arrangements or transactions that the ECJ believes represent tax 
avoidance that Member States are permitted to prevent. 
 257. See Ruth Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal 
Consistency Test, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (2008). 
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recommendations. Although the ECJ is not a political body, 
many commentators have noted throughout the years that its 
deference to Member State rules and its interpretation of the 
treaty freedoms fluctuate in line with the political pressures 
facing the European Union.258 Given that the Commission par-
ticipated in OECD meetings about the BEPS outputs and that 
twenty-two Member States of the EU participated in the BEPS 
Project, the ECJ could interpret the BEPS outputs as the result 
of international cooperation to which it should defer, and it 
could therefore see any restrictions arising from these as out-
side the scope of the treaty freedoms.259 This could provide 
Member States and non-EU countries with more certainty that, 
if they were to agree to heightened standards in any future in-
ternational agreements, those standards would be more pro-
tected than individual Member State rules.260 This would, how-
ever, contrast with the ECJ’s self-presentation as an apolitical 
body that is merely interpreting the Treaty freedoms, so it may 
be unlikely in the short term that the Court would follow this 
approach. 
Alternatively, the Court could also change its approach to 
deciding direct tax cases by accepting more justifications for 
provisions that are designed to prevent tax avoidance. As dis-
cussed above, the ECJ now accepts only a narrow group of jus-
tifications for direct tax provisions that discriminate based on 
jurisdiction, and it has rejected the need to raise revenue as an 
acceptable justification.261 In order to make it easier for Member 
States to prevent income shifting, it could accept other justifi-
cations, such as the need to prevent shifting of income across 
jurisdictions or the need to prevent double non-taxation. Such a 
development would, however, break from the Court’s previous 
case law, and it would also be inconsistent with the overall vi-
sion of the European Union as a single market since it would 
 
 258. See, e.g., Servaas van Thiel, The Direct Income Tax Case Law of the 
European Court of Justice: Past Trends and Future Developments, 62 TAX L. 
REV. 143 (2008). 
 259. An opportunity to exercise such deference could arise, for example, if a 
nexus-compliant patent box were to be challenged by a Member State taxpay-
er. See Case C-254/97 Société Baxter v. Premier Ministre, 1999 E.C.R. I-4809. 
 260. This version of deference by a supranational court to an international 
organization has not been discussed in detail in the international law litera-
ture on deference, most of which focuses on deference of international courts to 
domestic courts. See, e.g., DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBU-
NALS (Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014).  
 261. See supra Part II.A. 
  
1700 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1641 
 
allow more Member State measures to discriminate based on 
jurisdiction. 
C. RESPONSES TO COMPETITIVE PRESSURES FOR LOWER 
STANDARDS 
In the near term, therefore, the situation is likely to re-
main as it currently is: Member States cannot pass anti-
avoidance legislation that discriminates based on jurisdiction, 
and the EU institutions cannot pass anti-avoidance legislation 
at the EU level without unanimous Member State consent. 
This in turn means that, at least in areas where the ECJ has 
struck down Member State rules, international tax standards 
are themselves going to be pushed down by the effect that EU 
law has on the competitive landscape. The Member States’ un-
willingness to address this impasse could therefore continue to 
have effects on countries outside the European Union. 
In the longer term, however, as non-EU countries become 
more aware of the Luxembourg Effect (or, after the Brexit vote, 
as countries that were previously Member States become non-
EU countries that are now subject to the Luxembourg Effect 
and no longer have the ability to effectuate any of the above re-
forms), Member States may come under pressure from non-EU 
countries to either rescind the ECJ’s jurisdiction over direct tax 
cases or to eliminate the unanimity requirement for direct tax 
legislation.262 Since the effect of the ECJ’s decisions has now 
been exported outside of the European Union, some of the non-
EU countries most affected by the reduced international stand-
ards may start to apply pressure to the Member States to fix 
this situation. Therefore, although Member States previously 
rejected either of these solutions, the long reach of EU law may 
mean that the parties demanding change are no longer just the 
Member States. Instead, as illustrated by the nexus approach, 
the parties demanding change could end up expanding to in-
clude all those countries subject to the downward pressure of 
the ECJ’s decisions. This result would mean that, by exporting 
the effect of its decisions, the ECJ could also end up importing 
the political pressure necessary to solve the current impasse. 
 
 262. This pressure could be imposed in a variety of ways. The member 
countries of the OECD could, for example, implement a working group on the 
impact of EU law, or, in a more extreme example, non-EU countries could re-
fuse to ratify or modify double tax treaties with EU Member States in the ab-
sence of reform. 
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  CONCLUSION   
At the start of the BEPS Project, several countries and 
commentators expressed concern about the effect of patent box-
es on the international tax environment. They claimed that pa-
tent boxes were leading to reduced tax rates and greater oppor-
tunities for base erosion and profit shifting.263 In response, the 
OECD and G-20 designed the nexus approach to require these 
tax provisions to require substantial activities.264 While the 
nexus approach did impose limitations on patent boxes and 
may even lead to a reduction in the number of patent boxes in 
the long-term, it also included two separate versions: the main 
version, which focused on entities, and a version hidden in the 
footnotes, which focused on the location of the underlying R&D. 
As suggested by the BEPS Report that the OECD issued in 
2013, as well as empirical literature on the effectiveness of pa-
tent boxes, a limitation based on the location of the underlying 
R&D would have been the most logical way to curtail patent 
boxes and ensure that they achieved their stated goal of in-
creasing the amount of R&D in a jurisdiction. And yet the enti-
ty version of the nexus approach focuses on entities, which cre-
ates incentives to restructure and disincentives for outsourcing 
and acquisition, as well as more opportunities for income shift-
ing than a location-based approach. 
One reason for this deviation away from the more logical 
approach was EU law. Even though EU law created many of 
the base erosion and profit shifting opportunities that led to 
calls for the BEPS Project, the involvement of Member States 
of the European Union in the project meant that the outputs of 
the project were themselves limited by EU law. The pro-
avoidance jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice thus 
did not just have an impact on Member States of the EU. In-
stead, it had an impact on other countries as well, since these 
countries were now competing for revenue and taxpayers in an 
environment where patent boxes could be designed to comply 
with the more lenient entity version of the nexus approach. 
The nexus approach therefore illustrates the long reach of 
EU law. No longer do decisions of the ECJ just reduce the abil-
ity of Member States to pass direct tax legislation. They now 
also push down international standards on taxation through 
the Luxembourg Effect: where the lack of EU-wide regulatory 
 
 263. See Breidthardt, supra note 54; Houlder & Peel, supra note 54. 
 264. See BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 82. 
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authority and the ECJ’s jurisprudence combine to create a vac-
uum, that vacuum will lead to lower standards internationally 
when other countries are competing with the Member States of 
the European Union. In the context of tax avoidance, this 
means that it is now harder for all countries—including those 
not subject to the EU treaties—to police tax avoidance because 
the ECJ has interpreted anti-avoidance rules to violate the 
treaty freedoms. 
Although the ECJ and Member States could theoretically 
address this problem by agreeing to EU-wide tax legislation 
and reducing the ECJ’s jurisdiction over direct tax cases, these 
options seem unlikely, at least in the near future. The lesson to 
be learned from the nexus approach is therefore that academ-
ics, practicing lawyers, and negotiators alike must all be aware 
of the effect that the ECJ’s jurisprudence has on regulatory 
convergence in the direct tax area. While discussions of the im-
pact of this jurisprudence within the EU are important and rel-
evant, the conversation also needs to focus on the impact of this 
jurisprudence outside the EU and acknowledge that the Euro-
pean Court of Justice is making decisions that limit the ability 
of the United States and other non-EU countries to police and 
prevent international tax avoidance. 
